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THE VIRTUES OF "COMMAND AND 
CONTROL" REGULATION: BARRING 
EXOTIC SPECIES FROM AQUATIC 
ECOSYSTEMS 
Sandra B. Zellmer* 
The Clean Water Act asserts the ambitious goal of eliminating 
water pollution and protecting the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity o f  U.S. waters. Yet the EPA, in enforcing the Act, currently 
exempts from regulation a significant source of pollution in U.S. wa- 
ters: ballast-water discharges from commercial shipping vessels. 
Ballast water from commercial vessels is a primary vector for the in- 
troduction of exotic plant and animal species into U.S. waters. The 
invasion of these species poses an increasing threat to native biodiver- 
sity; the invaders prey directly on native fish and wildlife, compete for 
food and habitat, and introduce disease and parasites into commer- 
cial waterways. Given the severe economic and ecological conse- 
quences associated with exotic species, the lack of regulatory man- 
dates is a critical omission in U.S. environmental law. 
Ongoing debates on  environmental regulation focus o n  the ap- 
prop riate form for pollution restrictions. Specifically, the debates 
center on  whether the use of economic tools, such as subsidies or 
taxation, or regulation urtder technology-based permit regimes is 
more efSective in reducing pollution levels. In this article, Professor 
Zellmer suggests that regulation of ballast-water discharges under the 
Clean Water Act (CWA) would significantly reduce exotic invasions 
in U.S. aquatic ecosystems and is preferable to economic approaches. 
The article argues that the current regulatory exemption for ballast- 
water discharges is inconsistent with the plain language of the CWA.  
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It outlines the advantages of a regulatory program and addresses the 
practical implications of implementing the CWA permit system in the 
context of ballast-water discharges. 
"The success of technology-based standards in abating toxic water 
pollution depends largely upon one's predisposition to enjoy the 
donut or regret the hole."' 
The invasion and establishment of nonindigenous species of animals 
and plants is one of the few environmental issues in the United States as 
yet unaddressed through federal legal controls. The lack of regulatory 
mandates suggests a glaring omission in U.S. environmental law. Given 
the severe economic and ecological consequences associated with exotic- 
species invasions, regulation is essential to the physical and biological in- 
tegrity of U.S. land and waters. A primary source of exotic invasions in 
U.S. waters is ballast-water discharges from commercial shipping vessels. 
These discharges are largely unregulated.' 
Due to the lack of regulation, U.S. aquatic ecosystems have been 
invaded heavily by exotic species introduced through ballast water. 
Some of the most affected areas include San Francisco Bay, Chesapeake 
Bay, New York's Finger Lakes, and the Great Lakes region. The Great 
Lakes have been especially hard-hit by hostile and prolific invaders like 
the zebra mussel. In September 1999, the International Joint Comrnis- 
sion (IJC), comprised of Canadian and U.S. representatives, hosted a 
workshop to consider preventative measures to control Great Lakes' in- 
vasions, drawing upon the expertise of biologists, lawyers, and public of- 
ficials. A policy-based proposal, Exotic Policy: An IJC White Paper on 
Policies for the Prevention of the Invasion of the Great Lakes by Exotic 
Organism? (White Paper), served as the centerpiece for discussion at the 
workshop. 
The White Paper attempts to breathe new life into the perennial ar- 
gument that economic initiatives, such as subsidies or taxation, are more 
effective than "command-and-control" regulation in preventing pollu- 
- - -- 
1. Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related Programs, SB52 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 241, 256 
(1997). 
2. Although the National Invasive Species Act (NISA) provides guidelines for ballast-water 
exchange. the guidelines are not legally enforceable. See infra Part 11. Regulations issued by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exclude ballast-water discharges from the Clean Water 
Act's (CWA) permit program. See infia Part 111. 
3. Eric Reeves, Exotic Policy: An ZJC White Paper on Policies for the Prevention of the Inva- 
sion of the Great Lakes by Exotic Organisms (last modified July 15, 2000) <http://www.ijc.org/ 
milwaukee/wrkshps/exoticpolicy.html> [hereinafter Reeves, White Paper] (on file with the Universiry 
of Illinois Law Review). A revised version of the White Paper is published in Exotic Politics: An 
Analysis of the Economics, Law, and Politics of Exotic Invasions of the Great Lakes, 2 TOL. J .  GREAT 
LAKES' L., SCI. & POL'Y 125 (2000) [hereinafter Reeves, Exotic Politics]. 
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tion. Specifically, the White Paper concludes that economic tools are 
more likely to prevent the introduction of exotic species through ballast 
water than technology-based permit regimes4 However, this article sug- 
gests instead that regulation under the Clean Water Act (CWA) would 
be highly effective in preventing invasions in aquatic ecosystems, at least 
with respect to ships traversing U.S.  water^.^ 
The plain language of the CWA prohibits the discharge of contami- 
nated water from vessels unless a permit is ~b ta ined .~  Regulations issued 
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, exclude 
ballast-water discharges from the CWA's permit program.' This regula- 
tory exclusion finds no support in the statute. 
The CWA asserts the ambitious goals of eliminating water pollution 
and protecting the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of U.S. wa- 
ters.* To accomplish these objectives, the discharge of any pollutant 
from a point source is absolutely prohibited unless authorized by permit.9 
Point sources are generally known as discrete anthropogenic convey- 
ances, such as industrial pipes or conduits.1° Permits for point source dis- 
charges must incorporate effluent limitations reflecting the best technol- 
ogy available." Violations are redressed through the CWA's aggressive 
enforcement provisions, including citizen suits.12 These provisions are 
superior to control efforts based on economic measures alone,13 and, if 
effectuated by the EPA in the context of ballast-water discharges, would 
result in marked improvement over the status quo.14 
This article will first provide background regarding the effects of 
exotic species on aquatic ecosystems and the current legal framework 
governing ballast-water discharges. It will then turn, in part 111, to the 
relevant sections of the CWA. Part IV compares the advantages of a 
regulatory program for preventing the introduction of exotic species to 
economic approaches. Finally, parts V and VI address the practical im- 
. 
4. See Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, § 10.3. 
5. As aquatic species do not respect political boundaries, introductions through ballast water in 
Canadian and Mexican waters can have serious effects in the United States. However, this article is 
limited to an assessment of U.S. domestic law, in particular, the Clean Water Act. See Clean Water 
Act Amendment of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §$1251- 
1387 (1994)). For a discussion of the international implications of pollution from shipping, see Bany 
Hart Dubner, On the Interplay of International Law of the Sea and the Prevention of Maritime Poilu- 
tion- How Far Can a Stare Proceed in Protecting Itselffrom Conficting Norms in International Law, 
11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (1998). On the subject of controlling exotic species in the interna- 
tional law context, see David J. Bederman, International Control of Marine "Pollution" by Exotic Spe- 
cies, 18 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 677 (1991). 
6. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
7. See 40 C.F.R. 5 122.3(a)(l) (1999). 
8. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l) (1994). 
9. See id. 131 1(a). 
10. See id. 1362(14). 
11. See id. 5 1311(b)(2)(A). 
12. See id. 9 1365(a). 
13. See discussion infra Part IV. 
14. See id. 
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plications of implementing the CWA permit system in the context of 
ballast-water discharges and possibilities for interagency and intergov- 
ernmental cooperation in enforcing discharge regulations. 
11. EXOTIC SPECIES DISCHARGED WITH BALLAST WATER: EFFECTS 
AND CURRENT CONTROLS 
Exotic species have taken a heavy toll on U.S. waters.'' Numerous 
scientific and legal publications provide detailed assessments of the ad- 
verse consequences of exotic invasions in the Great Lakes and other 
aquatic ecosystems, particularly invasions from ballast  discharge^.'^ To 
set the stage for a discussion of economic and regulatory control meth- 
ods, this section of the article will outline some of the most serious ef- 
fects. 
Exotic species have made a significant contribution to overall envi- 
ronmental degradation and the decline of indigenous species.17 Their in- 
vasion "poses an increasing global threat to native biodiversity, ranked 
second only to habitat 10~s."'~ Some exotic invaders, like the rapacious 
sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus), depredate directly on native fish and 
wildlife,19 while others cause adverse effects by competing for food and 
habitat and by introducing disease and parasites.*' In the San Francisco 
Bay - an area that rivals the Great Lakes for "the dubious distinction of 
being the most invaded estuary in North Americav- exotic species "have 
15. See infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text. 
16. See, e.g., John J. Ewel et al., Deliberate Introductions of Species: Research Needs, 49 Br- 
OsClENCE 619,620 (1999); Brent Foster, PoNutants Without Half-lives: The Role of Federal Environ- 
mental Laws in Controlling Ballast Water Discharges of Exotic Species, 30 ENVTL. L. 99 (2000); David 
M. Whalin, The Control of Aquatic Nuisance Nonindigenous Species, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 65 (1998), avail- 
able in WESTLAW, ENVTLAW database; David P. Eldridge, Comment, Leviathan Lurks: Might the 
National Invasive Species Act of 1996 Actually Authorize Invasion by Proscribed Species?, 6 S.C. 
ENVTL. L.J. 47 (1997); Glenn Zorpette, Mussel Mayhem Continued: Apparent Benefits of Zebra Mus- 
sel Plague Are Anything But, 275 SCI. AMERICAN 2,22-23 (1996); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3; 
see also Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. 26,672, 
26,673 (1999) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151) (interim rule May 17, 1999) (stating that "[alquatic 
nuisance species invasions through ballast water are now recognized as a serious problem threatening 
global biological diversity and human health"). For additional information, see National Sea Grant 
College Program (visited Feb. 27,2000) <http:llwww.sgnis.org>, a comprehensive on-line collection of 
research publications and other materials about aquatic exotic species established by the Great Lakes 
Sea Grant Network. 
17. See Proposed Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 58 Fed. Reg. 20,802, 
20,807 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122,123,131,132) (proposed Apr. 16,1993). 
18. Ewel et al., supra note 16, at 620; see also David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to lm- 
periled Species in the United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607-15 (1998) (stating that exotics pose a serious 
threat to native species listed as federally endangered or threatened). 
19. See Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Sea Lamprey Control, (visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http:1/ 
www.glfc.org/lampcon.htm> (describing effects on native fishes such as lake trout, walleye, and white- 
fish). 
20. See Eric Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies Concerning Fzotic Invasions of the Great 
Lakes: A Report to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, at 8-9 (Mar. 15,1999), avail- 
able at <http:llwww.deq.state.mi.uslogYexotic2.pdf [hereinafter Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies]; 
Zorpette, supra note 16, at 22-23. 
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overwhelmed native species and dramatically altered the bay's life cy- 
cle. "21 
Exotic species also cause a variety of economic harms, due to de- 
clining fisheries as well as structural and ecological damage. Estimates of 
the annual costs attributable to exotic species nationwide, both terrestrial 
and aquatic, range as high as $123 billion.22 Total losses caused by only 
fifteen selected aquatic invaders, including the zebra mussel (Dreissena 
polymorpha) and the purple loosestrife plant (Lythrum salicaria), have 
been estimated at over $134 billion.23 The highly fecund zebra mussel is 
one of the most costly to control; national estimates range between $3-$5 
billion a year, in large part due to the expenses incurred by power plants 
to clear and maintain clogged intake pipes.24 The sea lamprey also causes 
significant losses to native fisheries, and $10 million is spent in the Great 
Lakes for annual control efforts and native-fish stocking costs.25 
Ballast water is one of the primary vectors for the introduction of 
exotic species into U.S. waters subject to commercial shipping.26 Vessels 
generally pump ballast water into tanks to replace the weight of off- 
21. Mary Curtius, San Francisco Bay: Cleaner but Still a Ways to Go,  L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10,1998, 
at Al ;  see San Francisco Bay Project, Water Resources Division, The History and Effects of Exotic 
Species in San Francisco Bay (visited July 15, 2000) <http://sfbay.wr.usgs.gov/access/exotic-species1 
exoticsp.pdf>; Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin 
River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. Reg. 4664,4665 n.3 (1995) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (stating that, due to the introduction of exotic species, as well as 
drought conditions and increased water diversions, the BaytDelta has experienced a "low level of bio- 
logical diversity"). The Chesapeake Bay is another water body that receives vast quantities of ballast 
water from almost fifty different foreign ports, but for reasons as yet unknown, the Chesapeake has 
not experienced infestations of exotic species to the same extent as other U.S. waterways subject to 
commercial vessel traffic. See Chesapeake Bay Commission, The Introduction of Nonindigenous Spe- 
cies to the Chesapeake Bay Via Ballast Water (visited Feb. 27,2000) chttp://nas.n£rcg.gov./ballast.htm>. 
22. See Dan Fagin, Foreign Species of Plants, Animals and Insects Endanger the Future of Our 
Homegrown Natural World, NEWSDAY, Apr. 11,1999, at A12. 
23. See Sharonne O'Shea & Allegra Cangelosi, Trojan Horses in Our Harbors: Biological Con- 
tamination from Ballast Water Discharge, 27 U .  TOL. L. REV. 381, 382-85 (1996); U.S. CONGRESS, 
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, HARMFUL NON-INDIGENOUS PECIES IN THE UNITED STATES 6 
(OTA-F-565, Sept. 1993) [hereinafter OFFICE OFTECH. ASSESSMENT]. 
24. See 16 U.S.C. !j 4701(a)(4) (1994). The zebra mussel attaches to water pipes, thereby re- 
stricting water flow and increasing sedimentation and corrosion, resulting in significant maintenance, 
plant-design, and shut-down expenses. See Zorpette, supra note 16, at 22-23; OFFICE OF TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 67. Each adult mussel is capable of filtering a liter of water per day; as 
a result, the zebra mussel has increased Lake Erie's water clarity but at the same time has dramatically 
reduced populations of phytoplankton, the foundation of the lake's food web. See Zebra Mussels and 
Other Nonindigenous Species (visited Feb. 27, 2000) <http:llwww.seagrant.vuisc.edu/GreatLakesl 
Glnetwork/exotics.html>. 
25. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 57. The Great Lakes Fishery Commis- 
sion estimates that the Eurasian ruffe, which has become one of the most abundant fish in Lake Supe- 
rior's harbors, could cause annual Losses to native fisheries exceeding $90 miIlion by competing with 
native fisheries and eating critical forage. See Eldridge, supra note 16, at 48 n.6; 142 CONG. REC. 
H10,925 (daily ed. Sept. 24,1996) (statement of Rep. Oberstar). 
26. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STEMMING THE TIDE: CONTROLLING INTRODUCTIONS 
OF NONINDIGENOUS SPECIES BY SHIPS' BALLAST WATER 11 (National Academy Press 1996) [herein- 
after STEMMING THE TIDE]; Foster, supra note 16, at 140; Whalin, supra note 16, at *16; Curtius, supra 
note 21, at A1 (noting that ballast water has-been responsible for introducing exotic species, particu- 
larly shellfish, to the Bay since the 1800s). 
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loaded cargo or expended fuel, thereby improving vessel stability in 
transport.27 The zebra mussel is perhaps the most well publicized of the 
invaders attributed to ballast-water discharges. Others include the Eura- 
sian ruffe (Gymnocephalus ~ e r n u u s ) ~ ~  round goby (Neogobius melanos- 
tor nu^),^^ the spiny water flea (Bythotrephes cederstroemi) and its more 
recently introduced relative, the fishhook water flea (Cercopagis pen- 
g ~ i ) , ~ '  and even human bacterial pathogens like cholera.31 
The discharge of ballast from commercial ships was virtually un- 
regulated until the early 1990s, when regulations were issued pursuant to 
the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 
1990 (NANPCA), as amended in 1996 by the National Invasive Species 
Act (NISA).32 Under NISA, vessels generally are required to exchange 
their ballast at sea before entering the Great As for other U.S. 
waters, NISA merely provides voluntary guidelines for ballast-water ex- 
change.34 The guidelines are designed to "ensure to the maximum extent 
- - - - - - - - - 
27. See STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 26, at 22. 
28. See Eldridge, supra note 16, at 47; Bederman, supra note 5, at 682. 
29. See Invasive Species: Sighting of Round Goby Worries Canadians, GREENWIRE, Aug. 2, 
1999, at 18. Once introduced into U.S. waters, the goby has been spread, in part, by its use as baitfish. 
Id. The introduction of the round goby may have some positive effects, as it is one of the few species 
that feeds on zebra mussels. See Don Zaidle, Catch-22,204 OUTDOOR LIFE, Dec. 1, 1999, at 20. Al- 
though the goby may control zebra-mussel populations, it may also absorb PCBs and other toxins that 
mussels filtered out of the water, passing those substances along to the bass and other native fish that 
feed on it. See Will Elliott, Biologists Wary as Gobies Work Their Way into W. NY Waters, BUFF. 
NEWS, NOV. 14, 1999, at B14; Janet Raloff, Invading Gobies Conquer Great Lakes, SCI. NEWS, July 31, 
1999, at 68. 
30. See O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 23, at 383. The fishhook water flea was discovered in 
1998 in Lake Ontario; it has since been documented in Lake Michigan and New York's Finger Lakes. 
See J. Raloff, New Flea Imperils Fish, Fouls Gear, SCI. NEWS, Nov. 13, 1999, at 308. Fifty to eighty 
fleas, which can fit within one square inch of space, hook together and form gelatinous masses, fouling 
fishing gear and devouring the plankton that larval fish need to survive. See id. 
31. See International Maritime Organization (IMO) Ballast Water Control Guidelines, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 64,831,64,831 (1991); O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 23, at 383-84 & nn.20-22 (1996) (citing, 
inter alia, Edward L. Mills et al., Exotic Species in the Great Lakes: A Hii-tory of Biotic Crises and 
Anthropogenic Introductions, 19 J. GREAT LAKES RES. 1,2-4 (1993)). But see Implementation of the 
National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. 26,672,26,674 (1999) (to be codified at 33 
C.F.R. pt. 151) (interim rule May 17, 1999) (stating that, although comments submitted on the Coast 
Guard's interim guidelines for ballast-water management noted that cholera was detected in ballast 
water, there was no "conclusive evidence that linked the strain of cholera detected to the wntami- 
nated shellfish in Mobile Bay"). Other species sometimes attributed to ballast water include plants 
like the purple loosestrife and Eurasian water milfoil; however, these species were more likely intro- 
duced through aquariums, nurseries, or other vectors. See id. at 26,674; Charles K. Dayton, A Frontal 
Attack on a New Menace to Minnesota Lakes, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., July 22, 1989, at 
11A. 
32. 16 U.S.C. $5 4701-4751 (1994 & Supp. I11 1997); see O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 23, at 
383. 
33. See 16 U.S.C. 5 4711. Vessels entering the Great Lakes are generally inspected at Montreal, 
Quebec, before they may enter the St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes ports. 
34. See id. 5 4711(c); see ako 33 C.F.R. § 151.2035(a) (1999) (requesting that vessels with ballast 
tanks take "voluntary precautions to minimize the uptake and the release of harmful aquatic organ- 
isms, pathogens, and sediments," including ballast water exchange and other management measures); 
Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. at 26,672 (issuing 
interim guidelines for vessels operating in U.S. waters other than the Great Lakes). 
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practicable that aquatic nuisance species are not discharged into waters 
of the United States from vessels," but they are not legally enf~rceable.~' 
Even in the Great Lakes, NISA does not specify federal require- 
ments for the "purity" of ballast water released. Instead, Coast Guard 
regulations employ a salinity standard recommending that ballast be at 
least 30 parts per thousand (ppt) salt.36 Although there is no evidence 
that 30 ppt salinity acts as an effective biocide, it presumably indicates 
that an ocean exchange of approximately eighty-five percent of water by 
volume occurred, thus flushing out species present in ballast water taken 
from foreign ports.37 However, even if eighty-five percent were consid- 
ered a reasonably adequate exchange, foreign flag vessels could enter 
U.S. ports with highly saline ballast water whether or not they have ac- 
complished an ocean exchange. Ships that fill their ballast tanks in 
highly saline ports, such as those on the Mediterranean Sea, may have a 
salinity factor equal or higher than 35.3 ppt, the average salinity of the 
Atlantic Ocean, before they even set In addition, evaporative 
losses during a transoceanic voyage tend to increase salinity in the tank.39 
Given these variables, the salinity test provides no guarantee that an 
ocean exchange occurred. 
There are broad-sweeping exemptions in NISA that further under- 
mine the exchange provisions. First, exchange can be avoided on the 
grounds of ship safety, a determination left almost entirely to the cap- 
tain's discretion.* Safety reasons may include "vessel architectural de- 
sign" or "other extraordinary  condition^."^' Accordingly, a captain who 
sails a poorly designed ship, or, arguably, a ship with an inexperienced 
crew or one sailing under a tight schedule can avoid ballast exchange. 
Ships that fail to accomplish an exchange outside the exclusive economic 
zone must employ another method of ballast-water management before 
entering the Great  lake^,“^ or request the Coast Guard's permission to 
exchange ballast water in an alternative designated area.43 The exemp- 
tion sweeps even more broadly for ships traversing U.S. waters other 
than the Great Lakes; they may avoid exchange on safety grounds, and 
then proceed to discharge water "in any harbor."44 
35. 16 U.S.C. 6 4711(c)(2)(A). 
36. See 33 C.F.R. 8 151.1510(a)(l) (1999). 
37. See Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies, supra note 20, at 57. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. See 16 U.S.C. $4711(k)(l). Safety is, of course, a valid consideration, given that the pumping 
of ballast tanks can create hull stress due to the change in buoyancy in one or another section of the 
vessel during the exchange process. But "hull stress is a chronic problem, particularly with older bulk 
carriers- related to age, maintenance, cargo loading, and sea conditions- regardless of whether or 
not those vessels are required to conduct ballast exchanges." Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies, 
supra note 20, at 52. 
41. 16 U.S.C. $ 4711(k)(l). 
42. See 33 C.F.R. $j 151.1510(a) (1999). 
43. See 16 U.S.C. Q 4711(k)(2)(B); 33 C.F.R. $151.1514. 
44. I6 U.S.C. $j 4711(k)(2)(A)-(B). 
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Perhaps NISA's greatest shortcoming is its failure to require treat- 
ment of residual sediments and slop in the tanks of ships fully laden with 
cargo, known as "no ballast on board," or NOBOB, vessels.45 While a 
ship is fully loaded with cargo, the residue in a ship's ballast-water tanks 
is ~npumpable."~ Although residual sediments and slop can support 
aquatic life forms, which subsequently will be mixed with ballast water 
pumped into the tanks, NISA imposes no requirements on NOBOBs. 
The Coast Guard has recognized that NISA is flawed and that man- 
datory standards could improve the quality of ballast water entering U.S. 
waterways. In 1998, the Coast Guard proposed a shift from the salinity 
test to performance standards, much like those required under pollution 
control statutes like the CWA.47 Under the proposed regulations, a 
ninety percent exchange requirement would replace the 30 ppt salinity 
test; salinity, among other things, would merely provide evidence that 
exchange occurred.@ However, these changes were not adopted when 
the interim rule issued in May 1999 "[blecause of strong opposition by 
the shipping industry."49 
Recently proposed amendments to NISA would require regulations 
for the treatment of ballast and NOBOB sediments entering the Great 
Lakes "to the maximum extent practicable . . . through the most effective 
and efficient techniques available, including sterili~ation."~~ The bill, en- 
titled The Great Lakes Ecology Protection Act of 2000, was introduced 
in April 2000, and is currently pending before the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastr~cture.~~ Although this could be a positive 
step toward technology-based regulation, as discussed below, the CWA 
addresses the problem in a more expedient and effective manner, with- 
out requiring legislative amendment. 
45. See Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies, supra note 20, at 54-55. 
46. See id. at 54; Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. 
Reg. 26,672,26,675 (1999) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151) (interim rule May 17,1999). 
47. See Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 63 Fed. Reg. 
17,782,17,784-85 (1998) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151) (proposed April 10,1998). 
48. See Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 63 Fed. Reg. at 
17.785, 17,789. The Coast Guard concluded that "90 percent is a reasonable standard to set, which is 
of minimal cost to the industry in that it does not require any changes to current ship designs, subject 
to the clearly stated exemption for vessels that cannot safely conduct an exchange." Id. at 17,785. 
49. Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3,  5 7; see Implementation of the National Invasive Species 
Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. at 26,672. Yet the Coast Guard's stated goal remains "for owners 
and operators to exchange 100 percent of the original water in the ballast tank" if possible given "op- 
erating systems and physical limitations of the vessel." Id. at 26,677. 
50. Great Lakes Ecology Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4191,106th Cong. (1999). 
51. See Thomas Bill Summary & Status (visited August 28, 2000) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. The 
bill has been referred to the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment and the Subcom- 
mittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. See id. (providing status of H.R. 4191, 106th 
Cong. (1999)). 
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111. THE CWA's APPLICATION TO BALLAST-WATER DISCHARGES 
FROM VESSELS 
The CWA embraces the simple yet profound goal of eliminating the 
discharge of water poll~tants.'~ To accomplish this ambitious goal, sec- 
tion 301 prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant by any person" unless a 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit is ob- 
tained.53 This key phrase, "discharge of a pollutant," is defined, in rele- 
vant part, as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any 
point source."54 Navigable waters include all surface waters of the 
United States, including lakes, rivers and streams, wetlands, and the ter- 
ritorial seas.55 
Pollutants are added to U.S. waters from a point source when bal- 
last water containing exotic species is discharged from vessels. Yet the 
EPA, by regulation, has excluded ballast-water discharges from the 
NPDES program: 
The following discharges do not require NPDES permits: (a) 
Any discharge of sewage from vessels, effluent from properly func- 
tioning marine engines, laundry, shower, and galley sink wastes, or 
any other discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel.56 
The Pacific Environmental Advocacy Center and other groups peti- 
tioned the EPA for the repeal of its regulation in January 1999.57 In re- 
sponse, the EPA acknowledged that ballast water could be covered by 
the CWA's prohibition on point source discharges, and stated that it 
would prepare a report to "explore options" for regulating ballast water 
by September 1, 1999.58 However, no official report or proposed rule has 
been issued to date. Once the EPA does make a final determination, it 
could be subject to a citizen suit under the CWA." 
A. Exotic Species Are Pollutants 
The language of the statute, as well as its objectives and legislative 
history, support the inclusion of exotic "pollutants" in the regulatory 
52. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l) (1994). 
53. Id. 8 1311(a), 1342. 
54. Id. $1362(12). 
55. See id. 8 1362(7)-(8). See generally 40 C.F.R. 5 122.2 (1999) (defining "waters of the United 
States"); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding an expan- 
sive regulatory definition of navigable waters as including certain wetlands). 
56. 40 C.F.R. $122.3(a) (1999) (emphasis added). 
57. See Letter from Craig N. Johnston, counsel for Pacific Environmental Advocacy Center 
(PEAC), e t  al., to Carol Browner (Jan. 13,1999) (on file with author). 
58. Letter from Charles Fox, Asst. Administrator, EPA, to Craig N. Johnston, PEAC (Apr. 6, 
1999) (on file with author). 
59. See 33 U.S.C. 9 1365(a)(2) (1994) ("[alny citizen may commence a civil action . . . against the 
Administrator [of the EPA] where there is alleged a failure . . . to perform any act or duty under this 
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator."); see also infra Part 1V.D. (discussing citi- 
zen suits). 
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pr~gram.~' The term pollutant, as used in the CWA, means heat and a 
variety of substances, such as garbage, solid waste, sewage, chemical 
wastes, and, most importantly here, biological  material^.^' Although the 
definition of pollutant in the CWA is not so broadly phrased as to be 
considered all-incl~sive,6~ courts have construed it to encompass sub- 
stances not specifically enumerated but subsumed under the listed, more 
general terms.63 Thus, fish and other organisms- alive, in various life 
stages, or dead- are included under the term "biological materials," and 
are therefore pollutants under the CWA.64 
However, courts have deferred to the EPA's determination that 
NPDES permits are not required when fish and fish parts are moved 
through a water body via dams because there is no "addition" of pollut- 
ants from dams: the fish do not come from the "outside world" but in- 
stead originate within the same ecos~stern.~~ Similarly, the transfer of 
cold water from an impounded reservoir through a dam to the receiving 
stream or river is not considered an "addition" of a p ~ l l u t a n t . ~ ~  By con- 
trast, seafood-processing plants that remove and process fish and then 
discharge the fish wastes into receiving waters of the United States are 
adding  pollutant^.^' 
The EPA has recognized that exotic species are pollutants under 
the CWA section 301 and in a variety of other contexts. For example, 
pathogens in sewage effluent are undoubtedly biological pollutants that 
60. See Whalin, supra note 16, at *10-12, 26-27 (reviewing legislative history of the CWA and 
determining that the definition of pollutants should include living aquatic invasive species); Reeves, 
White Paper, supra note 3, Q 1 (agreeing that exotic species are pollutants, as a matter of law, econom- 
ics, and common sense); see also Eldridge, supra note 16, at 49. 
61. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(6) (1994). 
62. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 19S2) (finding in 
dicta that cold, unlike heat, is a water condition; because cold is not specifically listed, while heat is a 
pollutant, cold is not a pollutant). 
63. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirming the district 
court's decision that petroleum products are included under the broad term "chemical waste," even 
though Congress did not list oil and oil products by name within the definition of pollutant); see also 
Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(holding that chlorine, when discharged into navigable waters, is regarded as a pollutant, though in- 
tended for a beneficial use), affd ,  940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991). 
64. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988); see 
also United States v. Dubois, 102 F.3d 1273,1296-97 & n.29 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that movement of 
organisms from river water to a pond is an addition of pollutants: although defendant's snowmaking 
did not itself contribute new pollutants, it was undisputed that the river contained at least some pollut- 
ants not found in pond, including the parasitic giardia lambia); Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 
615 F.2d 794,807 n.7 & 815 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that fish wastes discharged from seafood proc- 
essors are pollutants). 
65. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 584-86. 
66. Gorsudz, 693 F.2d at 161. 
67. See Association of Pacific Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 801; 40 C.F.R. pt. 408 (1999). Along the 
same lines, courts have found the movement of dredged-up sediments and debris, although indigenous 
materials at their place of origin, adds pollutants when introduced to another area. See United States 
v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501,1506 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on orher grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 
(1985), reh'g on other groimds, 863 F.2d 802 (1989); United States v. Banks, 873 F. Supp. 650,657 (S.D. 
Fla. 1995). 
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may not be discharged into navigable waters without a ~ e r m i t . ~  In addi- 
tion, in proposing regulations for the establishment of Total Maximum 
Daily Loads (TMDLs) pursuant to the CWA section 303,69 the EPA ex- 
plicitly stated that "all microbial contaminants that may be discharged to 
waters of the U.S. (e.g., bacteria, viruses, and other organisms) fall under 
the term 'biological  material^.""^ The EPA also implicitly acknowledged 
that invasive species contribute to water-quality impairment within the 
meaning of the CWA section 303 by approving California's list of 472 
impaired waters, including those listed as impaired because of the pres- 
ence of invasive species." The Coast Guard seems to be in agreement on 
this point, as it has also determined that exotic species discharged with 
ballast water should be considered  pollutant^.'^ 
B. Vessels Are Point Sources 
Vessels that discharge ballast water into waters of the United States 
are expressly included in the CWAYs definition of a "point source." The 
term is defined broadly in section 502(14) as "any discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, . . . or ves- 
sel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be dis- 
~harged."~' The definitional section excludes only "agricultural stormwa- 
ter discharges and return flows from irrigated agri~ulture."'~ 
Although an agency's construction of a statute under its administra- 
tion is generally given deference, an interpretation that flies in the face of 
68. See United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Cornm'n, [I9851 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20,621 (D. Mass. 1985); Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 986 F. Supp. 
1406,1422 (N.D. Ga. 1997); see also United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266,269-70 (E.D. 
Pa. 1978) (holding that bacteria in compost runoff is a biological material and therefore a pollutant), 
affd,  602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979). 
69. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Q 1313(d) (1994). Section 303(d) requires the identification 
of impaired waters and establishment of TMDLs. See discussion infra Part 1V.C (discussing TMDL 
program). 
70. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 46,012,46,017 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 130) (proposed Aug. 23,1999). 
71. See 33 U.S.C. Q 1313(d) (1994); Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Availability of List Submis- 
sions and Proposed Decisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,556,59,556-57 (1998); Foster, supra note 16, at 120; see 
also L. Blaney & T. Kemp, WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, 15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 149, 150 
(1995) (noting that an objective of California's plan is to reduce the impacts of introduced species on 
native species in the San Francisco BaylDelta estuary); Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Steelhead 
in Washington, Oregon, and California, 63 Fed. Reg. 13.347, 13,356-57 (1998) (to be codified at 47 
C.F.R. pt. 73) (describing the BayIDelta accord and efforts to develop a long-term solution to water- 
quality problems). 
72. See Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. 
26,672, 26,675 (1998) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151) (interim rule May 17, 1999) (stating that 
"anything that makes an ecosystem less suitable for an activity, or unfit for or harmful to living things 
is a pollutant," and concluding that nonindigenous organisms introduced through shipping activities 
should be considered pollutants); cf: Bederman, supra note 5, at 689 (concluding that exotic species 
should be treated as marine pollutants under various international agreements). 
73. 33 U.S.C. $1362(14) (1994) (emphasis added). 
74. Id. A limited exemption for storm water runoff from mining activities is found elsewhere in 
the CWA. See id. 9 1342(1)(2). 
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explicit statutory mandates, as does the EPA7s regulatory exclusion of 
ballast water, must be set aside.7s The EPA has met with unmitigated 
failure in the CWA context when it has attempted to carve out certain 
categories of point sources from the NPDES permit program. In NRDC 
v. Costle, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invali- 
dated the EPA's regulatory exclusion for a variety of discharges, includ- 
ing agricultural irrigation return flows - discharges that undoubtedly 
emanate from discernible conveyances- as inconsistent with the plain 
language of section 502(14), which at that time did not explicitly address 
return The court rejected the EPA's defense that requiring per- 
mits from agricultural activities would be difficult and expensive, stating 
that "technological or administrative infeasibility of [uniform national ef- 
fluent] limitations may result in adjustments in the permit programs. . . 
but it does not authorize the Administrator to exclude the relevant point 
source from the NPDES pr~gram."'~ In other words, if the discharger is 
a point source, only Congress can exclude it from the general prohibition 
of section 301; the EPA is not free to rewrite the statute. 
Not only is the ballast-water regulation inconsistent with the plain 
language of the CWA's "point source" definition, it undermines the 
CWA's straightforward and ambitious  objective^.^^ The CWA is in- 
tended "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in- 
tegrity of waters of the [United States]" by eliminating water p~llution,'~ 
and to ensure that water quality supports fisheries and other designated 
uses.8o There can be no dispute that invasive species, no less than other 
pollutants, have had tremendous effects on the quality and native biodi- 
versity of U.S. waters. 
75. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (holding that courts re- 
viewing statutory interpretations by agencies should first determine whether the statute is ambiguous; 
if not, the court may not defer to the agency, but must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute); 
see akio Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483,489 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding Alaska's ap- 
plication of the NPDES permit system to oil-tainted ballast water discharged from vessels, and noting 
that the CWA provided only limited exemptions to the otherwise comprehensive NPDES program). 
76. See NRDC v.  Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377-79 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Congress subsequently 
amended section 502(14) to explicitly exclude irrigation return flows. See 33 U.S.C. 9 1362(14) (1994). 
77. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1379. 
78. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d at 493 (finding that CWA's objectives sup- 
port Alaska's application of the NPDES program to ballast water). 
79. 33 U.S.C. J 1251(a) (1994) (emphasis added). A parallel provision is found in the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the United States and Canada, which states that its purpose 
is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of waters of the Great Lakes 
Basin Ecosystem." Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes 
Water Quality 1978, Nov. 24, 1978, as amended by the Protocol of 1987, US.-Can., art. 11, 30 U.S.T. 
1383, 1387. Although the Agreement imposes no specific requirements with respect to exotic species, 
Annex 6, dealing with pollution from shipping sources, calls for studies to determine if exotics in bal- 
last-water discharges constitute a threat to the Great Lakes ecosystem. See id. at 1429 (annex 6). 
However, like the CWA, the focus of the Agreement to date has been the control of chemical con- 
taminants, particularly toxic pollutants. 
80. See 33 U.S.C. 0 1251(a)(2) (1994). 
No. 41 VIRTUES OF "COMMAND AND CONTROL" REGULATION 1245 
Moreover, neither the legislative nor the regulatory history supports 
the exclusion of ballast-water discharges.'' Although the CWA's legisla- 
tive history does not specifically address ballast water, it specifies that all 
discharges to waters of the United States, the contiguous zone and the 
ocean, "were to be regulated by EPA under one Act or the other,"82 The 
Committee on Public Works and Commerce intended "complete and in- 
tegrated regulation of the disposal of pollutants into all waters and over 
all sources of pollutants subject to its jurisdi~tion."~~ 
The regulatory history of 40 C.F.R. 5 122.3 indicates that the EPA 
did not intend to exclude ballast-water discharges from commercial ships 
when the regulation was first issued in 1973. The provision as originally 
proposed in the federal register excluded only "discharges from properly 
functioning marine engines."84 The final regulation was extended to 
"discharges incidental to the normal operation of a vessel," but not trash 
discarded overboard and discharges from vessels acting in a capacity 
other than transportation, "such as when a vessel is being used as a stor- 
age facility or a ~annery."'~ The EPA's explanation reflects that the ex- 
clusion for incidental discharges was meant to apply to recreational 
boats, not commercial vessels: "This type of discharge generally causes 
little pollution and the exclusion of vessel wastes from the permit re- 
quirements will reduce administrative costs dra~tically."'~ 
- 
81. See infra notes 82-108 and accompanying text. 
82. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 
32,853, 32,859 (1979) (citing Senate Committee on Public Works, Federal Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1971, S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 74 (1971), reprinted in 2 LTBRARY OF CONGRESS, A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1492 
(Cornm. Print compiled for the Senate Cornm. on Pub. Works 1973), and referencing the CWA and 
the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. Q 143i (1994)). The Ocean Dumping 
Act complements the CWA with regard to discharges outside of the CWA's jurisdiction, as it prohibits 
vessels registered in the United States or flying a U.S. flag from transporting "any material for the 
purpose of dumping it into ocean waters." 33 U.S.C. 9 1411(a)(2) (1994). It also prohibits any person 
from dumping "any material transported Erom a location outside the United States" into U.S. territo- 
rial seas, or the U.S. contiguous zone if it may affect U.S. territorial seas or territory, unless a permit is 
obtained. Id. Q 1411(b). For discussion of the CWA's jurisdictional limitations, see irlfra note 104 and 
accompanying text (defining "contiguous zone" and "territorial seas"). 
83. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. at 
32,859 (citing Senate Committee on Public Works, Federal Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1971, S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 74 (1971), reprinted in 2 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL A m  AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1492 (Comm. Print 
compiled for the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works 1973) (emphasis added)). 
84. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Revision of Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. 
1362, 1363-64 (1973) (proposed Jan. 11, 1973); see Daniel E. 07Toole, Regulation of Navy Ship Dis- 
charges under the Clean Water Act: Have too Marly Chefs Spoiled the Broth?, 19 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1,12-13 (1994) (discussing history of EPA's ballast-water exemption). 
85. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg. 13,527, 13,530 (1973) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. Q 125.4(c)); see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Revision of 
Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. at 32,859 (stating that, although the CWA does not define "'vessels or other 
floating craft,' it appears that those terms refer to transportation vessels"). 
86. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg. at 13,528. The legislative 
history of the CWA seems to support a limited exclusion for recreational vehicles. Congress appar- 
ently believed that permitting for millions of recreational boats would be an "u~easonable expendi- 
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At least two other provisions of the CWA provide additional sup- 
port for treating ballast discharges as point sources subject to the 
NPDES program. First, statutory amendments enacted in 1996 exclude 
incidental discharges from military vessels from the definition of pollut- 
ant.'' At  that time, Congress expressly noted that "[v]essels are point 
sources of pollution" under the CWA.8' Given the operational problems 
experienced by the Navy when various coastal states attempted to im- 
pose inconsistent regulatory requirements or inspection programs on na- 
val Congress believed that an alternative program was desirable 
for the military. Thus, instead of obtaining NPDES permits to discharge 
their ballast water, military vessels must comply with standards of per- 
formance to be specified by regulation under another new provision, sec- 
tion 312(n),90 which requires on-board, marine-pollution-control devices 
if such devices are reasonable and pra~ticable.~' 
This exclusion provides at least some evidence that Congress in- 
tended for incidental discharges, such as ballast water, from nonmilitary 
vessels to be included in the NPDES program. Generally, an explicit ex- 
clusion of one activity negates an implied exclusion of another type of ac- 
t i ~ i t y . ~ ~  
However, courts could view the enactment of a statutory exclusion 
for military vessels differently. The fact that Congress had notice that 
the EPA was, by regulation, excluding all ballast discharges from 
NPDES coverage, and had amended the relevant provisions of the CWA 
with respect to military discharges only, could indicate congressional ap- 
proval of the EPA's r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  Because "the views of a subsequent 
ture of administrative effort" as well as an "unreasonable burden on the individual boat owners." 
O'Toole, supra note 84, at 12-13 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 16,875-76 (1972)). 
87. See Uniform National Discharge Standards for Armed Forces Vessels Act § 325(c)(3), 33 
U.S.C. 5 1362(6) (Supp. IV 1998). 
88. S. REP. No. 104-113, at 1 (1995). 
89. See O'Toole, supra note 84, at 12-13 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-113, at 1,7). 
90. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1322(n) (Supp. IV 1998). 
91. See id. 1322(n)(1), (2); 40 C.F.R. pt. 1700 (1999); see also discussion infra Part VI. 
92. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608,618 (1980); League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. 
v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 1979); see also City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense 
Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (In refusing to imply an exemption for incinerator ash from the haz- 
ardous-waste provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Court noted 
that Congress had provided a complete exemption in a separate section of RCRA by utilizing a com- 
prehensive list of relevant activities, and therefore "knew how to draft a waste stream exemption in 
RCRA when it wanted to"); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hamrnond, 726 F.2d at 488-90 (noting that the 
CWA's explicit exclusion for certain types of discharges supported inclusion of ballast water in the 
NPDES program). 
93. See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cu. 
1987) (holding "the congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive 
evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress" and quoting NLRB v. Bell Aero- 
space Co., 416 U.S. 267,274-75 (1974)). Although it is not always realistic to infer approval of a judi- 
cial or administrative interpretation from congressional silence, see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 
119-21 (1940); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118,140-41 (1941), once an agency's statu- 
tory construction has been "fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress," and Con- 
gress has not sought to alter it although it has amended the statute in other respects, then a court may 
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Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier 
one,"94 postenactment developments like the exclusion for military ves- 
sels cannot be given the weight of contemporaneous legislative reports or 
 statement^.'^ Even so, in determining the reasonableness of an agency's 
interpretation of a facially ambiguous statute, courts will not ignore 
authoritative congressional expressions, post hoc though they may be.96 
If a court found the CWA ambiguous on this point, a longstanding 
administrative interpretation like C.F.R. 5 122.3 might be upheld. How- 
ever, a reviewing court would be on firm legal ground if it found the 
definitional provisions of CWA section 502, along with the general pro- 
hibition of section 301;' clear and unambiguous. If so, the postenact- 
ment legislative history would merit little, if any, weight." If the statute 
is plain on its face, courts need not resort to legislative history for con- 
firmation, but must give the language of the statute "its natural mean- 
ing."99 Although the EPA does have some power to define technical 
terms like "point source" and "pollutant ,7"00 broad-sweeping categorical 
exemptions like the one for ballast discharges from commercial vessels 
should be rejected as inconsistent with the plain language of the CWA.'O1 
The second provision that supports the inclusion of ballast-water 
discharges in the NPDES program is found in the CWA's definition of a 
"discharge of a pollutant." As discussed above,'02 this section expressly 
includes discharges to navigable waters "from any point source"; it also 
presume that the agency has correctly discerned the 1egisIature's intent. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. 
Leader, 310 U.S. 469,487-89 (1940). 
94. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Syivania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-19 (1980) (citing 
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963) and United States v. Price, 361 
U.S. 304,313 (1960)). 
95. See Redlark v. C.I.R., 141 F.3d 936,941 (9th Cir. 1998). 
96. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,535 (1982); Cannon v. University of Chi- 
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979); Estate of Wallace v. Commissioner, 965 F.2d 1038, 1050-51 n.15 
(11th Cir. 1992); McDonald v. Commissioner, 764 F.2d 322,336 n.25 (5th Cir. 1985). Subsequent leg- 
islative action, such as the amendment of a related statute or provision, is accorded more weight than 
subsequent statements. See Bell, 456 U.S. at 534-35; Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,300-01 (1981). 
97. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), 1362(6), (14) (1994). 
98. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (Where a statute 
"contains a phrase that is unambiguous- that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and 
judicial practice-we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual 
legislators or committees during the course of the enactment process."); see also United States v. Ron 
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,241 (1989) ("[Wlhere, as here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole 
function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms."'); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 
at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."). 
99. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,386 n.2 (1992); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at 842-83; Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1980). The statute 
itself, not committee reports or other legislative statements, provides the "authoritative expression" of 
the law. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337-38 (1994) (holding that 
ash generated by resource recovery facility's incineration of municipal solid waste was subject to Re- 
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulatory scheme governing hazardous waste pur- 
suant to plain language of section 3001(i), 42 U.S.C. 5 6921(i)). 
100. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,167 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
101. See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,1375 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
102. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text. 
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includes discharges to the contiguous zone or the ocean "from any point 
source other than a vessel or floating crafr."lo3 The term "navigable wa- 
ters" includes the territorial seas, which extends three miles seaward 
from the ordinary low-water mark, but not the contiguous zone, which is 
the area beyond the territorial seas.lo4 Accordingly, by negative implica- 
tion, vessels that discharge ballast to inland waters and territorial seas are 
in fact discharging pollutants from point sources.lo5 
Other statutes and executive materials validate this interpretation of 
the CWA. NISA, enacted after the CWA, states that it does "not affect 
or supercede any requirements or prohibitions pertaining to the dis- 
charge of ballast" under the CWA.lo6 This generally applicable, broadly 
worded savings clause indicates that the CWA should apply to ballast- 
water discharges in United States waters.lo7 
Finally, as a matter of federal policy, Executive Order 13,112 directs 
the EPA and other agencies to "use relevant programs and authorities 
to . . . prevent the introduction of invasive species."'08 Thus, the EPA not 
only has the authority and even the mandate to regulate ballast under the 
CWA, but also should do so as a matter of federal prerogative. The EPA 
has experience and technical expertise in controlling pollution from a va- 
riety of sources. By comparison, the Coast Guard, an agency within the 
103. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994) (emphasis added). 
104. The CWA defines the contiguous zone as three to twelve miles from the U.S. baseline. See 
id. 3 1362(7)-(9) (defining navigable waters, territorial seas, and contiguous zone); Convention of the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,1958, art. 33,15 U.S.T. 1606,1612-13,516 U.N.T.S. 
205, 220-22 (defining contiguous zone as the area from three to twelve miles beyond the nation's 
baselines). The CWA definition incorporates the relevant international convention existing at the 
time of the CWA's enactment, although the more recent 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that a nation's contiguous zone may extend out to 24 nautical miles 
from its baselines. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 33, U.N. 
Doc. AIConf. 621122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1276 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Nations may 
generally exercise jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels that violate its customs, fiscal, immigration, or 
sanitary laws if the vessels are traveling within their contiguous zone. See id. art. 2; see ako Dubner, 
supra note 5, at 141 (noting that coastal states exercise almost exclusive jurisdiction over internal wa- 
ters but cannot interfere with innocent passage of foreign vessels). 
105. See cases cited supra note 92 (explicit exclusion of one thing negates implied exclusion of 
another). 
106. 16 U.S.C. 9 4711(b)(2)(C), (c)(2)(J) (1994). 
107. The legislative history of NISA indicates that Congress wanted to ensure that the CWA con- 
tinue to govern the discharge of oily or chemical-laden ballast. See Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee, S. REP. NO. 101-523 on S. 2244, at 6 (1990). reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6455, 
6460 (S. 2244 was incorporated into H.R. 5390, which was then passed into law as the Nonindigenous 
Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990,16 U.S.C. 9 4701 (1994), amended in 1996 by 
the National Invasive Species Act (NISA)). However, there is no evidence that Congress intended to 
limit this provision to ballast contaminated with oil or chemicals. To read such a limitation into the 
statute would fail to do justice to the plain language of NISA's broadly phrased savings clause, in vio- 
lation of the principle that the language of the statute itself, not the legislative statements, provides the 
"authoritative expression" of the law. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 
337 (1994). 
108. Exec. Order No. 13,112,64 Fed. Reg. 6183,6184 (1999). 
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Department of Transpor ta t i~n, '~~ has a wholly different mission- safety 
on inland waters and territorial seas."' Its responsibilities include en- 
forcing federal laws on waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States; protecting life and property at sea; aiding navigation through ac- 
tivities such as ice breaking; and maintaining readiness to function with 
the Navy in time of war."' The Coast Guard could advance the Order's 
directive, as well as the objectives of both the CWA and NISA, by sup- 
porting the EPA's efforts to control water pollution. 
The CWA itself envisions working relationships between EPA and 
other agencies, even those with development-oriented missions, in other 
contexts. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers issues permits for 
dredge and fill activities that affect wetlands under section 404, while the 
EPA holds veto power over those permits."* The two agencies are re- 
quired to jointly issue wetlands reg~1ations.l'~ Although the relationship 
is not always an easy one,l14 the different perspectives of the two agencies 
contribute to the strength of the overall program.'15 Likewise, a coopera- 
tive arrangement between the EPA and Coast Guard would be mutually 
beneficial in the context of ballast-water discharges. 
IV. THE EFFE~IVENESS OF REGULATORY PROGRAMS 
Few would deny that the quality of surface waters in the United 
States has improved immensely in the past quarter-century or that sig- 
nificant progress has been made in cleaning up pollution from industrial 
109. See 14 U.S.C. Q 1 (1994). The Department of Transportation is generally known as a devel- 
opment-oriented department. See Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evo- 
lution of Environmental Law, 63 Mrss. L.J. 403,454 (1994). 
110. See 14 U.S.C. 9 2 (1994). 
111. See id. § 2. 
112. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 9 1344(c) (1994); James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330, 
1335 (4th Cir. 1993); 40 C.F.R. 9 231.l(a) (1999). 
113. See NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685.686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
114. See, e.g., Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the EPA veto of 
CWA section 404 permit issued by Corps). See generally Heidi Wendel, Comment, Bersani v. EPA: 
Toward a Plausible Interpretation of the 404(b)(l) Guidelines for Evaluating Permit Applications for 
Wetland Development, 15 COLUM. J .  ENVTL. L. 99,104-07 (1990). 
115. See Benjamin H .  Grumbles & Kenneth J. Kopocis, The Water Resources Development Act of 
1992: Expanding the "Corps of Environmental Engineers", [I9931 23 EnvtI. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,379, 10,389 (June 1993) (noting that, in carrying out the CWA's goals, both Congress and the EPA 
may justifiably rely more on the Corps' expertise "in water management, wetlands protection, and 
other issues addressing both water quality and quantity"). "As water quality and quantity issues be- 
come increasingly linked, so too will activities of EPA and the Corps." Id. 
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point ~ources."~ Sections 301 and 402 of the CWA "deserve[] a lion's 
share of the   red it.""^ 
A. The Efficacy of Regulatory Programs Versus Economic Initiatives 
In keeping with the recent hue and cry for regulatory reform,ll8 
economic solutions have found favor in academiau9 and both federal ex- 
ecutive and legislative initiatives.120 However, regulatory approaches 
-- - - 
116. See Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401,23 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 201, 202-03 (1996); see also Brian Weeks, Trends in Regulation of Stormwater and Nonpoint 
Source Pollutiorl, [I9951 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,300, 10,301 (June 1995) (noting that the 
CWA has "drastically reduced surface water pollution from point sources"); Houck, supra note 109, at 
417 (discussing drop in point source discharges due to the CWA). 
117. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins 
and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1994). There are, of course, divergent viewpoints 
on this particular point, but those are, perhaps, more a matter of perception than of fact. As Professor 
Oliver Houck so aptly put it: "The success of technology-based standards in abating toxic water pollu- 
tion depends largely on one's predisposition to enjoy the donut or regret the hole." Houck, supra note 
1. For example, Daniel Cole & Peter Grossman make a well-reasoned argument, using extensive eco- 
nomic data for Clean Air Act programs, that regulatory programs in general are cost effective. See 
Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Eficient? Institutions, Tech- 
nology, and the Comparative EfFciency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protec- 
tion, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999). Curiously, they then note in passing that the costs imposed by the 
CWA have outweighed water-quality benefits. See id. at 937. The CWA's costs were estimated at 
between $25 and $30 billion, while the range of estimated benefits varied from $6 to $28 billion. See 
id. at 937 11.162 (citing A. Myrick Freeman 111, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL P R O T E ~ I O N  97,125-26 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990)). The referenced study may 
understate benefits if, instead of focusing on improvements made in point source pollution reduction, 
it includes water-quality problems caused by nonpoint source pollution; one could well conclude that 
very little improvement has been made on that front. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There 
Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Bmed Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, [I9971 27 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,391,10,401 (Aug. 1997). 
118. Regulatory reform has gained renewed interest and vigor since a Republican-controlled 
Congress took its seat in 1994, but it had its supporters in earlier years as well, especially during the 
Reagan Administration. See Thomas 0 .  McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 
T E X .  L. REV. 1243 (1987): Dale B. Thompson, Beyond Benepr-Cost Analysis: Institutional Transaction 
Costs and Regulation of Water Quality, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J.  517 (1999). Most recently, a bill to rein 
in the EPA by forcing a consideration of the economic impacts of certain regulatory decisions has 
been introduced in the 106th Congress. See Air Quality Standard Improvement Act of 2000, 146 
CONG. REC. S2236,S2237 (sponsored by Sen. Voinovich, R-OH). 
119. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 74-110 (1990); CASS R. SUNSTEM, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JusncE 276 
(1997); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1333 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulations: Central Planning Versus 
Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547,550-52 (1992); Symposium, Free Market 
Environmentalism: The Role of the Market in Environmental Prorection, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
297 (1992). 
120. See, e.g.. EPA, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282-83 (1995) 
(proposed May 23,1995) (proposing "Project XL" to provide businesses greater flexibility in meeting 
environmental goals and embracing "Common Sense Initiative" to allow six industries to develop 
"cleaner, cheaper, smarter" approaches to regulation). The Clinton Administration has "jumped on 
the reinvention band-wagon by announcing several initiatives to further this goal," including a pro- 
posal to extend compliance schedules for effluent standards for companies adopting innovative ap- 
proaches for pollution prevention. Paula C. Murray, Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory Re- 
form- IS0 14000: Much Ado About Nothing or a Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 35,37 (1999) 
(citing BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULAT~ON 43 (1995)); see ako 
Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environ- 
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have a well-proven track record in the abatement of water pollution, and 
there is no reason to believe that it is time to throw out the proverbial 
baby with the bath water simply because "command-and-control" regula- 
tion does not always render optimal economic efficiency. 
1. Looking Back: Regulatory History and Experience 
It is often said that hindsight is twenty-twenty. Of course, taking 
heed of this perspective is another matter altogether. 
If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! 
But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experi- 
ence gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves 
behind us!121 
Coleridge7s poetic statement illuminates the history of U.S. efforts 
to control water pollution, counseling against dramatic reforms. Al- 
though technology-based regulatory programs may well be imperfect,122 
they have been an enormous on-the-ground success,'23 yielding measur- 
able net benefits to ~0c ie ty . l~~  There is little doubt that the shift to tech- 
nology-based controls in the Federal Water Pollution Control Amend- 
ments of 1972 resulted in significant process changes, as well as 
measurable pollution abatement, for the first time in years of federal in- 
volvement in water q~a1i ty. l~~ 
Prior to 1972, the federal approach was largely concentrated on 
providing grants to the states to encourage improvement in environ- 
mental performance. When federal funding initiatives failed to address 
discharges from chronic pollution sources, like publicly owned sewage- 
treatment plants (POTWs), the CWA was amended to limit discharges to 
a specified level based on the technological capacity of the category of 
discharger in question. For POTWs, this meant secondary treatment, 
along with pretreatment requirements for toxic pollutants and phased-in 
regulation of storm water o v e r f l o ~ s . ' ~ ~  Finally, significant progress oc- 
curred.12' 
- - .- 
mental Law, 23 HARV. Ern~. L. REV. 297,307 (1999) (noting that the "Clinton Administration has 
shown particular interest in renegotiating regulatory standards"). 
121. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1831), in THE OXFORD D I ~ I O N A R Y  OF QUOTATIONS 157:20 (3d 
ed. 1980). 
122. See ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., mE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 150-70 (1993). 
123. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Tech- 
nology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729,743. 
124. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 917-18 (assessing benefits attributable to Clean Air 
Act technology-based standards). 
125. See Oliver A. Nouck, supra note 109, at 418, 463; see also Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 
123, at 746 n.96 (reporting that the CWA's initial performance standards caused "some impressive 
reductions in conventional pollutant discharges," citing data on reductions from pulp and paper mills 
from 1973 to 1984, in COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS 31 (1989)). 
126. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. $5  1314(b)(2), 1317(b), 1342(p) (1994). 
127. See generally Valentina 0. Okaru, Financing Publicly Owned Treatment Works and Institut- 
ing Enforcement Measures Against Non-Compliant Works Under the Clean Water Act, 2 BUFF. ENVTL. 
L.J. 213 (1994). Federal funding is still a component of the POTW program, but before obtaining 
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This movement toward technology-based controls can best be de- 
scribed as the "convergent evolution" of successful environmental law: 
over the course of time, the job of pollution prevention selected the 
proper In the water-quality context, the NPDES permit program 
emerged as the proper tool. Its technology-based standards won "their 
primacy because other approaches simply couldn't hold their terrain."12' 
By providing the necessary pressure of outside-in federal regulation, the 
"best available technology" (BAT) standard became "the most effective 
pollution-control program in the world in terms of producing identifiable 
abatement-short of outright bans-if only because alternative pro- 
grams have proven equally burdensome and so much less effe~tive."'~~ 
Although in theory economic and regulatory programs appear 
vastly different, in implementation, the differences between well- 
designed, effective economic tools and regulation are not that significant. 
In fact, the few economic initiatives currently utilized in the United 
States for controlling pollution have adopted many of the features of 
regulatory regimes.13' The most successful market-based pollution con- 
trol tool, the Clean Air Act's acid rain program for trading sulfur dioxide 
emissions, operates within a "command-and-control" framework where 
predetermined emission caps limit the operation of market f 0 r ~ e s . l ~ ~  It 
also entails a substantial governmental role in overseeing trading activity 
and compliance with caps. And, as the Clean Air Act itself demon- 
funds, "the applicant for a federal construction grant must show that its project is the most economical 
means of meeting effluent and water quality goals in a specific geographic area." G. Nelson Smith 111, 
Lawmaker as Lawbreaker Enforcement Actions Against Municipalities for Failing to Comply with the 
Clean Water Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 685,70-ol(1993). 
128. Houck, supra note 109, at 407, 427-28.; see also Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 894, 
914-35 (describing regulatory evolution, focusing on the Clean Air Act); Samuel P. Hays, The Future 
of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 549,550 (1996) (noting the incremental nature of change 
in environmental regulation). 
129. Houck, supra note 109, at 427; see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three 
Economies: Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, Practice and Societal Governance in Which Every- 
thing is Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 366, 374-78, 379-82 (1999) 
(generally discussing historic failure of market economics to address environmental problems). 
130. Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, [I9911 21 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,528, 10,541-42 (Sept. 1991); see also Houck, supra note 109, at 417- 
24 (describing gains made in the reduction of emissions going into water and other media under "best 
available technology" approaches currently required by various pollution-control statutes). Winston 
Churchill's quote about democracy as the best form of government is analogous, and can be easily 
adapted to describe technology-based regulation: "No one pretends that [it] is perfect or all-wise. . . . 
[I]t has been said that (it] is the worst form of [control] except ail those other forms that have been 
tried from time to time." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150:19 (3d ed. 1980). 
131. See David M .  Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the 
Command and ControUEconomic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 293 (1998) 
(noting that the schism between the two is not so great as one might imagine); Bruce A. Ackerman & 
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 
COLUM. J .  ENVTL. L. 171,171 (1988) (describing conflict between market incentives versus regulatory 
bureaucracy as a false dichotomy). 
132. Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 892 (citing J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, 
POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: E V A L U A ~ N G  THE SYSTEM 15 (1998) (noting that "the 
differences between command-and-control regulations and economic instruments . . . is 'not as stark as 
it appears"')). 
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strates, whether an economic or a regulatory approach is adopted as the 
pollution-control methodology of choice, economic impacts and incen- 
tives will undoubtedly occur.'33 
Yet the White Paper and an array of scholars and legislators criticize 
regulatory approaches for failing to effectuate an optimal ratio of bene- 
fits over costs. In a market-based economy such as that of the United 
States, economic efficiency is undoubtedly one goal of 1egi~lation.l~~ Ad- 
vocates of regulatory devolution go wrong, however, in their tendency to 
assume that economic efficiency is the only, or at least the most impor- 
tant, goal of environmental legislation. Other key values, such as 
sustainability, equity, environmental justice, and even a "land ethic," de- 
serve at least as much attention.135 Absent regulatory forces, these values 
tend to get side-lined when left to the marketplace. 
Even if economic returns were the primary concern, existing studies 
do not necessarily support the argument that technology-based regula- 
tion is less efficient than market-based ~ r0g ra rns . l~~  The Corporate Av- 
erage Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards imposed by the Clean Air Act 
provide an example of a regulatory program that has been found "twice 
as important" as gasoline prices in stimulating automobile manufacturers 
to develop fuel-efficient ~ehic1es. l~~ Moreover studies have shown re- 
peatedly that economic objectives are undermined when "free" resources 
like clean air and clean water are exp10ited.I~~ The absence of regulatory 
133. See infia Part 1V.B (discussing efficacy of emission-trading programs). 
134. See Plater, supra note 129, at 366 (noting that the marketplace is arguably "the single most 
dominant structure of human organization today,. . . the structure and processes of the marketplace 
powerfully drive the choices of what will and will not be done by all participants"). 
135. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 201-26 
(1949); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 195-96 (1988); Marshall J. Breger et al., Pro- 
viding Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J .  ON REG. 463, 481-82 (1991); Er- 
win Bulte & G.C. Van Kooten, Economic Science, Endangered Species, and Biodiversity Loss, 14 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 113,118 (2000); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 743. 
136. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 892 (describing market proponents as "ahistorical 
and acontextual" in their assessments). 
137. Id. at 891-92 (citing David L. Greene, CAFE or Price? An Analysis of the Effects of Federal 
Fuel Economy Regulations and Gasoline Price on New Car MPG, 1978-89, 11 ENERGY J. 37, 37 
(1 990)). 
138. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); see also R.H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (explaining why cost externalization is a 
logical and powerful tendency in human behavior); Plater, supra note 129, at 365 (describing the "uni- 
versal tendency.. . toward cost externalization"); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter- 
Revolution- The Kepone Incident and a Review of First Principles. 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 660 
(1995). 
Rachel Carson showed us. . . that this tendency is dominated by short-term individualized think- 
ing and can be quite dysfunctional in overall terms. Humans, corporations, and disparate seg- 
ments of the environment are not dissociated individual islands floating in a vacuum; they live in 
a web of direct and indirect interconnections. Externalities go somewhere and tend to have seri- 
ous accumulated consequences that can end up dwarfing the short term actions that spawned 
them. Then and now, however, humans and their marketplace do not voluntarily rush to take 
into account the negative effects of what they do, so law is necessary and inevitable. 
Id. at 660 (citing RACHEL CARSON, SILENTSPRING (1962)). 
1254 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2000 
mechanisms to internalize costs otherwise shared by the public at large 
inevitably leads to a "Tragedy of the  common^."'^^ 
To the extent that excess costs do occur as a result of regulatory 
programs, economic initiatives, whether in the form of subsidies, taxes, 
or trading programs, share a variety of arguably more serious deficien- 
cies. Such defects can sometimes be disguised, however, by the econo- 
mists' failure to fully account for the institutional, political, and temporal 
context of the pollutant or activity of concern. Of course, both regula- 
tory adherents and market proponents can be accused of overlooking the 
nuances of context in weighing alternative pollution-abatement initia- 
tives. But market proponents have demonstrated a tendency to ignore 
fluctuations over time in marginal costs, societal values, technological 
capabilities, and governmental institutions, all of which are critical in as- 
sessing the true benefits and costs of an economic prograrn.lm 
For example, when pollution-control requirements are first im- 
posed, the incremental costs of attaining environmental improvement are 
relatively low because the least expensive approaches are generally im- 
plemented first, resulting in the largest gains in abatement. Additional 
abatement increments grow more and more expensive over time, after 
the "quick fix" has been exhausted. Meanwhile, monitoring equipment 
to accurately measure pollution at the source may become more readily 
available, suggesting a more dire situation than previously realized. By 
focusing on the latter stages of a regulatory life span, market proponents 
can make the case that established regulatory programs are too expen- 
sive. However, over time, as abatement costs begin to rise, so do incen- 
tives to develop less-expensive new techn~logies.'~' Ultimately, once im- 
proved abatement technologies and monitoring capacities are in place, 
more finely tuned controls are made possible, and economic initiatives 
may well become a feasible supplement, rather than distinct alternative, 
to the regulatory regime.142 
Proponents of economic approaches also tend to understate the dif- 
ficulties of estimating both economic and environmental benefits and 
costs at any given point in the contextual spectrum.143 Ecological costs 
139. Hardin, supra note 138. 
140. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 892. 
141. See id. at 893-94; Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental 
Regulation: A New Erafrom an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 1,4-I5 (1991); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., 
Environmental Policy - It Is Time for a New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J .  ENVTL. L. 111,113 (1989). 
142. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 930-31,933 (discussing development of continuous- 
emission monitors for electric power plants, and the subsequent success of the 1990 Clean Air Act's 
sulfur dioxide emissions-trading program). 
143. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 735-36. Shapiro and McGarity make the case 
that the economists' position that the costs of "overregulation7' exceed its benefits are based on "vast 
technical uncertainties and anchorless moral judgments reflected in the cost-benefit calculations for 
health and safety standards." Id. For example, regulatory critics argue that the vinyl chloride safety 
standard saves only one life per year at a cost of $40 million. See id. at 731-33 (discussing J. 
MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES REGULATION: HOW OVERREGULATION 
CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 3, 22 (1988) and Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 
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and benefits are likely to be significantly undervalued when placed 
within the rubric of marketplace  economic^.'^^ The Department of Inte- 
rior has grappled with this problem for years in promulgating regulations 
for the assessment of natural-resource damages. A key component of its 
final regulations was invalidated because its assessment methodology re- 
lied too heavily on market or "use" value of the lost or damaged re- 
~ 0 u r c e . l ~ ~  The government could not show- and in fact had "made no 
claimv- that use value would actually pay for restoration, replacement, 
or acquisition of equivalent resources, as required by the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Recovery Act (CER- 
CLA).146 Indeed, the Department "could not possibly maintain that re- 
covering $15 per pelt for the fur seals killed by a hazardous substance 
release would enable the purchase of an 'equivalent' number of fur 
As for costs, an economic-incentive program, whether tax-based or 
otherwise, could be equally, or even more, expensive than a technology- 
based regulatory program. The transaction costs and information costs 
associated with market-based initiatives tend to be relatively high.'48 In 
addition, monitoring and enforcement costs may be higher, as economic 
approaches provide incentives to hide emissions to avoid pollution taxes 
or maximize s~bsidies . '~~ Inspectors would be required to monitor the 
amount of pollution emitted from all possible discharge points on an ag- 
gressive and continuous basis to assess the appropriate amount of a pol- 
lution tax or subsidy, an expensive and labor-intensive endeavor.150 Con- 
versely, regulatory strategies are generally less expensive to monitor and 
enforce because inspectors need only determine whet her the discharge at 
the discharge point meets the BAT-based effluent limitations or, in the 
case of performance standards, whether the required technology has 
been installed and is being properly operated.''' 
1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 629-30). Shapiro and McGarity respond that this calculation is based on ex- 
tremely limited risk-assessment tools. See id. at 733-35. It fails to account for the regulation's numer- 
ous benefits other than saving lives (e.g., the mental and emotional well-being attendant to maintain- 
ing a productive workforce free of nonfatal diseases), and is based on a willingness-to-pay model 
defined by the wage received for working in dangerous conditions, discounting the fact that many 
workers simply cannot pay. See id. 
144. See Plater,supra note 129, at 37677,379. 
145. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432,433 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
146. 42 U.S.C. 9 9607(f)(1) (1994). 
147. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at  445. 
148. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 890-92. 
149. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 749. 
150. See id. 
151. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 918-19 (finding that monitoring and enforcement 
costs tend to be higher for market-based programs). The CWA gives the EPA explicit authority to 
impose record-keeping, sampling, and reporting requirements, and to inspect and gather data on the 
premises, see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1318(a) (1994), thus keeping enforcement costs lower than 
might otherwise be the case. See generally Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: 
Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 
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2. Looking Forward: Regulatory Staying Power and Innovation 
Perhaps the predominant criticism of regulatory programs is that es- 
tablishing emission levels based on current technology squelches future 
innovation. It stands to reason that industry would be reluctant to invest 
in the research and development of new control methods when it knows 
that operational costs will increase as the BAT standard is ratcheted 
up.lS2 Although this is a legitimate concern, there is another side to the 
story. 
[Ojstensibly cost-blind standards can help stimulate the develop- 
ment of improved pollution control technology. . . . Regulations 
that confront industry with the prospect of substantial compliance 
costs create greater incentives for the development of cheaper con- 
trol technology. Time and time again, after regulations have gone 
into effect, regulatory targets have proven able to do what they pre- 
viously claimed was impossible when they were seeking to forestall 
the regulations. A study of industrial responses to regulation found 
that the stringency of regulation was "the most important factor in- 
fluencing technological inn~vation." '~~ 
Moreover, polluters themselves are not the only potential source of 
pollution-control innovations. As a case in point, the new source- 
performance standards required by the 1970 Clean Air Act resulted in 
the dramatic growth of independent environmental industries, who raced 
to invent "green" technologies in hopes of capturing emerging new mar- 
ket~. ' '~ 
In comparison, economic incentives, such as subsidies or taxation, 
do not necessarily stimulate environmental improvement and may even 
result in fewer emission-reducing innovations than regulatory controls.155 
Economic subsidies- actions that provide commodities, capital, or serv- 
ices at below market cost- are especially unlikely to encourage techno- 
logical advancement. Certainly, subsidies can be appropriate to redress a 
- -- - - -- 
1270-71 (1985) (concluding that regulatory programs result in decreased costs for information collec- 
tion and evaluation, and greater consistency and predictability of results). 
152. See Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why k This Thoroughbred 
Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. E m .  L. 217, 234-36 (1988); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 279 (2d ed. 1977); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, 9 10.3 (quoting a vice presi- 
dent of Chrysler, discussing achievable technology for reducing emissions, "We're all worried that if 
we sound hopeful, what will the damned standards be tomorrow?"). 
153. Robert V. Percival. Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U .  
CHI .  LEGAL F. 159,179 (1997) (citing Nicholas A. Ashford, Understanding Technological Responses of 
Industrial Firms to Environmental Problems: Implications for Government Policy, in ENVIRON- 
MENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY 282 (Kurt Fischer & Johan Schot, eds., Island 1993)). 
154. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 911 n.56 (citing Robert Repetto, Air Quality Under 
the Clean Air Act, in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 221,276-77 (Thomas C. Schel- 
ling ed., 1983)). In 1996, the U.S. environmental-technologies industry "produced $436 billion in 
global revenues and employed 1.3 million people." Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ENVI- 
RONMENTAL INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW BY STATE AND METROPOLITAN 
STATIS~CAL AREA 1 ( O C ~ .  1997)). 
155. See David M. Driesen, supra note 131, at 294. 
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private-market failure, as in mass transit, or where public needs would 
otherwise go unmet, as in parks, the arts, and occasionally, scientific re- 
search.'56 Finely tuned subsidies to private-sector industry may even be 
unobjectionable if necessary to maintain community stability or  advance 
other legitimate public policies.'57 Government support for various New 
Deal programs during the Great Depression, for example, made sense 
given the need to promote economic development, increase employment 
and overall living conditions, and protect or restore natural resources in 
the face of dust-bowl  condition^.'^^ Similarly, the "Swamp Buster" provi- 
sions of various federal farm bills, mandating cuts in existing subsidies for 
farmers who convert wetlands to crop p r o d ~ c t i o n , ' ~ ~  have had beneficial 
environmental effects, likely because land-use controls are otherwise so 
difficult to regulate at the federal level.160 
Governmental programs aimed at supporting the economic position 
of particular industries must be subject to constant reevaluation to en- 
sure continued efficacy in light of changing circumstances. Economic 
supports should be designed in a way that ultimately eliminates the need 
for their continued existence.161 In the case of contaminated ballast- 
water discharges, where industry is externalizing pollution-control costs 
and imposing them on the general public, subsidies are most likely not 
appropriate at all.16* Even those who laud incentive-based instruments as 
the method of choice for controlling pollution generally agree that subsi- 
dies are an inefficient tool for achieving environmental quality because 
the resulting reductions in operational costs can attract new entrants and 
156. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE 
FUTURE OFTHE WEST 19 (1992). 
157. See id. 
, 158. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 157-58, 
172-73 (Harper Paperback 1963) (discussing soil conservation measures and the Rural Electricifica- 
tion Administration); David A. Taylor, A Noble and Absurd Undertaking, 30 SMITHSONIAN 100, 108 
(2000) (by supporting authors like Richard Wright, Studs Terkel, and Margaret Walker, the Works 
Progress Administration federal writers' project "fostered 'what nobody believed was possible at that 
time- a renaissance of the arts and American culture"'). 
159. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 5 3821 (1994). 
160. See Oliver Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, [I9991 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,469, 10,483 (Aug. 1999) (noting success of swamp buster programs); Linda A. Malone, Reflections 
on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an Agrarian Democracy and the Emergence of an Agricultural and Envi- 
ronmental Ethic in the 1990 Farm Bill, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1993) (describing conservation pro- 
grams). 
161. See WILKINSON, supra note 156, at 19 (citing U.S. CONG., JOINT ECON. COMM., 89TH CONG., 
1ST SESS., SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDY-EFFECT PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 1 (Comm. Print 
1965)). 
162. Subsidizing the shipping industry for abating discharges of contaminated ballast water is all 
the more inappropriate in the Great Lakes because, as noted in the White Paper, the Great Lakes 
shipping industry is already subsidized as a result of the initial and ongoing government support for 
the construction and maintenance of the Saint Lawrence Seaway. See Reeves, White Paper, supra note 
3, § 10. The implications of any form of pollution abatement subsidy would require detailed economic 
assessment and consistent monitoring throughout implementation to determine the extent of synergis- 
tic or unintended effects. 
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greater investments in the polluting industry, creating perverse incentives 
for the industry to increase overall net emis~ions. '~~ 
Likewise, taxation, although held in "nearly reverential regard" by 
proponents of economic initiatives for accomplishing environmental 
quality,l6" is not without problems and would not necessarily stimulate 
rapid innovations. Assuming that a ballast-water tax applied to foreign 
vessels is allowed by international trade agreements,16' the tax rate itself 
would need to be reevaluated almost continually to ensure that it is set at 
an appropriate and effective level. Because there is virtually no way to 
calculate with precision exactly how much abatement will result from any 
given pollution tax, rates must be adjusted over time to meet abatement 
g0a1s.l~~ Yet, legislatures are historically unwilling to revise tax rates af- 
ter they are initially set.167 "[Tlhe current income tax system, with its 
monument to the ingenuity of tax avoidance, does not inspire optimism 
on this point."la 
During the time it takes for the taxation system to reach "steady 
state," proceedings to establish or adjust a tax rate will be highly conten- 
tious and time-consuming (that is, unless society is willing to tolerate 
high exposure levels in the interim).'69 Industry tends to resist any 
change to status quo, both because change typically requires immediate 
capital outlays and because it results in devaluation of existing expertise 
within firrns.l7O As a result, implementation of a pollution tax is likely to 
be far slower than aggressive implementation of the current regulatory 
~cherne."~ Given the existing uncertainties about the presence, potential 
for entry, and severity of effects of the next aquatic invader, the added 
163. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 726-27 (1999) (citing WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE 
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 211-28 (2d ed. 1988) (1975)). In addition, "compensating risk- 
makers for their costs of abatement (under subsidies) will induce risk-makers to make more risk." Id 
at 726 n.186. 
164. Id. at 727 (citing Frank S. Arnold, The Economist's Perspective: Why There Are No Pollution 
Taxes, ENVTL. F.,  Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 14). 
165. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, art. 111. See generally Robert Charles Griffitts, Note, Broadening the States' 
Power to Tax Foreign Multinational Corporations: Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 46 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 243 (1996). 
166. See Shapiro & McGarity,supra note 123, at 748. 
167. See id. 
168. Id. at 749. 
169. Id. at 745. 
170. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 924, 926. In fact, although the United States has 
embraced emissions trading as a supplemental tool to control air emissions, there are no environ- 
mental taxes in place, perhaps because organized special interests (industry) have strenuously resisted 
the idea. See David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 45 (2000) (explaining avoidance of taxation schemes through public-choice political 
theory). 
171. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 744-45. 
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uncertainty as to the appropriate level of taxes, along with the attendant 
delays of shifting to a new program, may well be intolerable.17* 
In contrast, regulatory requirements that force the adoption of im- 
proved technology will result in timely emission reduction, and perhaps 
even greater efficiency and lower costs.'73 The best performers will not 
necessarily be disadvantaged by technology-based effluent limitations. 
The CWA's NPDES program can actually level the playing field for 
companies that implement technological controls, because all facilities 
within an industrial class are required to meet a minimum threshold of 
  clean lines^."^^^ Facilities that improve their environmental image by 
adopting innovations in technology could gain competitive advantage if 
their "green" reputation is touted through effective marketing and public 
relations eff~r ts ."~ Meanwhile, uniform standards decrease the likeli- 
hood of social dislocation and "forum shopping" that can otherwise re- 
sult in competitive disadvantages between geographical regions or be- 
tween firms in regulated ind~stries."~ At the very least, over the years 
"the BAT process has proven, against vigorous opposition and the most 
dire predictions, that pollution could in fact be reduced without signifi- 
cant losses in employment, competitiveness, control, or industrial 
Implementation of the Clean Air Act has demonstrated that, al- 
though industry routinely overestimates compliance costs, it subse- 
quently achieves legislative goals without a loss in its ability to compete. 
For example, the oil industry claimed that phasing out lead in gasoline 
would cost ninety-five percent more than it actually did.17* Similarly, pes- 
172. See id. at 745. The White Paper itself acknowledges that its conclusions raise "some highly 
complex questions about the synergistic interaction of taxes, subsidies, and regulatory costs in various 
competing segments of industry which are beyond the analysis I can present here." Reeves, White Pa- 
per, supra note 3, $ 10.3. 
173. See Wendy E .  Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U .  ILL. L. REV. 
83, 94-100 (describing expeditious and efficacious nature of environmental technology-based stan- 
dards); Houck, supra note 109, at 430 (noting that requirements for alternative technology, incIuding 
even outright bans of harmful substances, e.g., leaded gasoline and DDT, can force industry to find 
alternative means of production or alternative, less-destructive products and, in doing so, save money 
as well). 
174. See Reeves, Exotic Politics, supra note 3, at 192 (noting that the shipping industry asked the 
Vancouver Harbour Master to issue a standing order making a voluntary ballast-exchange initiative 
into a mandatory program); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, $7.4. 
175. C '  Wagner, supra note 173, at 108-09 (describing competitive advantages for existing 
sources that engineer the development of improved technologies). 
176. See Latin, supra note 151, at 1270-71; see also NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,1377 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (effluent limitations imposed by NPDES permits impose minimum, uniform floors below 
which neither individual nor jurisdictional efforts may sink, thereby avoiding the "race to the bottom" 
that would otherwise result among jurisdictions with different requirements). 
177. Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, [I9911 21 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,528,10,541-42 (Sept. 1991). 
178. See Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Technological Innovation, and Technology- 
Forcing, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 64,67; Percival, supra note 153, at 168-70. Ironi- 
cally, although Nixon's proposal for a stiff tax on lead additives in 1971 to encourage their phase-out 
was given short shrift by Congress at the time, the subsequent inclusion of mandatory lead phase-out 
1260 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2000 
simistic estimates of the costs of the acid rain program adopted in the 
1990 Clean Air Act amendments were overstated by almost fifty percent, 
as emissions trading and regulatory restrictions encouraged the use of 
low-sulfur western coal and scrubbers, and utilities responded favorably 
to rewards for conservation and renewable energy.179 Also as a result of 
the 1990 amendments, ozone-depleting CFCs were phased-out, and 
ozone-friendly substitutes became more readily available. lsO 
Regulatory programs often are accused of rewarding older, dirtier 
plants through "grandfather" provisions, providing them with an incen- 
tive to continue relatively cheap operations while placing new technolo- 
gies and firms at a disadvantage.181 Although stringent, the CWA's pro- 
visions for new sources do not necessarily inhibit new construction. The 
CWA does not mandate the creation of new technology out of whole 
cloth, but simply requires new sources to adopt the best technologies al- 
ready demonstrated for use by the industry in question.lg2 Once the ap- 
plicable standard is applied to the new source, that source will not be 
subjected to more stringent standards of performance during the ten- 
year period following completion of construction, or depreciation or am- 
ortization of the facility, whichever date is earlier.lS3 Thus, the new 
source requirement is unlikely to put most shippers in economic jeop- 
ardy, assuming they had economically viable operations in the first 
place.'s4 Meanwhile, the effluent limitations for existing sources are to be 
. . .- 
in the Clean Air Act is now described as "the singular success story in air pollution control." Id at 
168. 
179. See Percival, supra note 153, at 168-70. The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act gave the 
EPA authority to stimulate and support a market in emission allowances by conducting auctions of 
those allowances. The allowance price for the EPA auction was set at $1,500 per ton. See Auctions, 
Direct Sales and Independent Power Producers Written Guarantee Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,592 
(1991); see also 42 U.S.C. 9 7651c tbl. A (Affected Sources and Units in Phase I and Their Sulphur Di- 
oxide Allowances). At the time of enactment, industrial economists projected that the "cost" of sulfur 
dioxide allowances would be up to $700 per ton. See New Strategies for a New Market: The Electric 
Industry's Response to the Environmental Protection Agency's Sulfur Dioxide Emission Allowance 
Trading Program, 47 A D M ~ .  L. REV. 469,475 (1995). When trading began, the actual cost turned out 
to be around $150 per ton. See id. It was predicted that. as "industry develops and becomes more 
competitive, however, utilities will have no choice but to adopt cost-effective and economically effi- 
cient policies.. . . (As a result], the demand for emission allowances will increase and a strong and ac- 
tive trading market will emerge." id. at 491. 
180. See Percival, supra note 153, at 168-70. 
181. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 131. at 174 n.5 (citing sources regarding differential 
treatment of old and new facilities); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through 
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J .  ENVTL. L. 153, 158 (1988) (arguing that the more stringent treat- 
ment of new sources encourages existing sources to prolong their design lives and discourages new 
sources, with state-of-the-art water pollution technology, from entering the market); Reeves, White 
Paper, supra note 3 , s  10. 
182. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1316(b)(l)(B) (1994) (requiring best available demon- 
strated technology (BADT)). 
183. See 33 U.S.C. Q 1316(d) (1994). 
184. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 744 n.80 (reaching similar conclusion with re- 
spect to the BAT standard applied to existing sources). Perhaps in recognition of the potential for 
stringent BADT standards to create incentives to keep older, dirtier facilities operating, the EPA has, 
on occasion, attempted to set BADT for new sources no higher than BAT, but these efforts have met 
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reviewed and revised every five years, so that improvements in technol- 
ogy will eventually find their way into the BAT standards for existing 
sources.lR5 Existing sources could be forced to retire if they cannot meet 
revised technology-based effluent limitations. 
Without question, the statutory regime could do a better job of en- 
couraging innovation and phasing out the oldest, dirtiest dischargers. 
The BAT review and revision process, which has been bogged down with 
the weight of industry resistance and litigation from both sides,'86 could 
be enhanced in several ways. The EPA needs to obtain and devote more 
resources to move the process along, while building a strong, defensible 
administrative record for improved standards. In addition, the agency 
could offer incentives to existing facilities that adopt cleaner technolo- 
gies, and encourage them to share that technology with other facilities, 
through competitive grants or finely focused short-term subsidies. 
Alternatively, legislative amendments could be adopted to encour- 
age emissions and technology trading,ls7 or to explicitly phase-out old 
vessels that refuse to retrofit or treat their ballast water to the greatest 
degree allowed by advances in technology. Congress in recent years has 
been able to design at least one technology-based regulatory regime that 
has encouraged new sources to implement new technology, while phasing 
out old, dirty facilities. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 imposes, 
over a period of twenty years, a double-hull requirement for existing ves- 
sels starting with the oldest, largest vessels. It also requires double hulls 
for all new vessels built for oil transportation when they operate in U.S. 
waters or the U.S. exclusive economic zone.lg8 
The OPA has spurred active competition among naval architects to 
build a safer supertanker, and the world's first double-hull supertanker 
was completed in Denmark in 1992.1R9 Since the OPA was enacted, sig- 
nificant declines in oil spills, both in number of incidents and amounts 
with judicial disapproval. See Houck, supra note 109, at 463 (discussing litigation and reversal of pet- 
rochemical industrial standards, in Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 883 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
185. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(d) (1994). 
186. See Houck, supra note 109, at 456 & 11.240-41. Another potential "loophole" for existing 
sources is found in CWA section 301(c), which allows modification from uniform effluent limitations 
for a variety of reasons, including the facility's "economic capability." 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(c). 
187. See Natalie M .  Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to Foster 
the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3&32 
(1996). For discussion of emissions-trading programs, see infra Part 1V.B. 
188. See 46 U.S.C. Q 3703(a) (1994); Double Hull Standards for Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk, 57 
Fed. Reg. 36,222 (1992) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 155,157,46 C.F.R. pts. 30,32,70,90,172). For ex- 
isting vessels, the double-hull requirement is phased in over several years, depending upon the size 
and age of the vessel, beginning in 1995, and proceeding in stages until 2010, when all vessels over 5000 
gross tons must be equipped with double hulk. See Jeffery D. Morgan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: 
A Look at Irs Impact on the Oil Industry, 6 FORDHAM  EN^. L.J. 1 ,7  (1994). 
189. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
145 (2d ed. 1996) (citing Richard L. Hudson, Tanker Safety Plans are Mulled as Oil Spill Threatens 
Shetlandr, WALL ST. J . ,  Jan. 8,1993, at A7B). 
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spilled, have o c c ~ r r e d , ' ~  and although freight rates increased by ap- 
proximately ten percent,lgl the flow of oil being shipped to the United 
States has continued with no significant interruptions.lg2 Attesting to the 
OPA's efficacy, the International Maritime Organization has followed 
suit by adopting regulations that will require double hulls or equivalent 
safety features for all new oil tankers.193 
B. Supplementing Regulation with Economic Incentives 
Once regulations are in place, technological improvement could be 
encouraged through supplemental market-based tools.lg4 The emissions 
trading program of the 1990 Clean Air Act, for example, has enjoyed 
success not by replacing national air-quality standards, but by providing 
flexibility in reaching predetermined goals - the permissible levels of ex- 
posure already set by the Act.lg5 
Emissions-trading programs authorize polluters to receive and ex- 
change permits, which allow a certain amount of pollution emission. 
Permit recipients have several choices: they may emit only the amount 
of pollution allowed by the permit; they may buy additional permits to 
emit more than would otherwise be allowed; or they may reduce ernis- 
sions and sell excess permit allowances. As a result, polluters that can 
190. The Coast Guard reported the following data for U.S. waters: 1991 -three spills totaling 
55,000 gallons (the lowest level in 14 years); 1992- 1 spill a t  98,700 gallons; 1993- 1 spill releasing 
33,500 gallons; 1994- 1 spill at 35,700 gallons. See id. at 144. 
191. See id. at 143. 
192. See id. at 145 (citing Reuters, Oil Supplies Unaffected by Tanker Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 
1994, at D4). Up until late 1999-early 2000, oil prices were the lowest seen in decades. See Continuing 
Decline in Oil Prices Benefits Consumers and a Wide Range of Industries, WALL ST. J . ,  Dec. 2, 1998, at 
A2; Jeffrey Ball, Gasoline Price Rise Worries Auto Makers, WALL ST. J . ,  Dec. 8, 1999, at A2 (reporting 
that, although oil prices rose somewhat during fall 1999, "[rletail prices, adjusted for inflation, fell to 
their lowest level last year since pump prices began to be tracked in 1918, according to the American 
Petroleum Institute"). Crude oil prices have increased throughout 2000, due in part to high consumer 
demand spurred by a strong economy, and to new federal mandates for cleaner-burning gasoline. See 
Alexei Barrionuevo, New Environmental Rules and Production Worries Create Shortage Fears, WALL 
ST. J . ,  May 16,2000, at A2. 
193. See PERCIVAL, supra note 189, at 145. 
194. See Houck, supra note 109, at 427-31,454 nn.226-28. 
195. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b (1994). Under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amend- 
ments of 1990, annual emissions of sulfur dioxide, which, together with nitrogen oxide, contributes to 
acid rain, must be reduced by 10 million tons by 2010. See id.; Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Win- 
ner, A Clean Air Act Primer: Part 11, [I9921 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,235,10,253-56 (Apr. 
1992). Title IV provides that pollution allowances may be allocated to fossil-fuel, electric-utility gen- 
erating units, based on the utility's past emissions and fuel consumption. See Garrett & Winner, supra. 
Allowances over and abcve those needed for operation may be traded to other utilities, all the while 
moving toward the overall emission goal. Tradable excess allowances may be obtained by abating 
more than required by law or by implementing conservation plans, e.g., use of renewable energy 
sources. See id. For a discussion of the effectiveness of Title IV in reducing interstate air pollution, 
see Acid Rain: Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Drop 17 Percent in 1990-98 Period, GAO Report Indicates, 
31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 577 (2000); Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 930-33; Dallas Burtraw & 
Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 
[I9961 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,411 (Aug. 1996); Eileen L. Kahaner, GAO's Analysis of 
Title IVS Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 239,251 (1995). 
No. 41 VIRTUES OF "COMMAND AND CONTROL" REGULATION 1263 
reduce emissions most cheaply will sell extra allowances to those who 
face higher abatement costs, thereby achieving economic efficiency.'% 
Trading initiatives in general are cost effective only in situations 
where regulated facilities face different marginal control costs, and where 
reductions can be made more cheaply by some individual facilities than 
by others.lg7 Although many categories of facilities and vessels subject to 
the CWA may meet this criteria, it is not clear that existing law allows 
trading as a supplement to the NPDES program, or that such a program 
would be an effective tool for addressing ballast-water discharges. 
Unlike the Clean Air Act, the CWA does not explicitly authorize 
effluent-trading programs.lg8 The EPA, however, construes the CWA to 
allow dischargers to trade waste Ioad allocations as a means to imple- 
ment the TMDL program for meeting water-quality standards.lg9 The 
Clinton administration's 1994 "Clean Water Initiative" lends its support 
to trading programs, and recommends that the EPA study trading oppor- 
tunities and publish additional guidance regarding possible pollutant 
trades.*'' 
Although emissions trading may well be a viable option for meeting 
water-quality objectives through TMDLs, the NPDES program is less 
amenable to trading. The TMDL requirement provides a relatively close 
parallel to the Clean Air Act approach, by focusing on the achievement 
196. See Jeffrey M .  Hirsch, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act: A Model for 
Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352,355 (1999). 
197. See Alexandra Teitz, Note, Assessing Point Source Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study in 
Controlling Selenium Discharges to the San Francisco Bay Estuary, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79,81-82 (1994) 
(noting that these factors allow a market to develop, but that transaction costs can "impose trading 
barriers and reduce realizable cost savings"). For an interesting comparison of the costs of Germany's 
effluent-trading system with the costs associated with the CWA7s technology-based requirements, see 
Thompson, supra note 118, at 538-39 (concluding that, depending on certain variables, including how 
much industry spends to lobby Congress and the regulators, effluent trading may be more cost- 
effective). 
198. See Elise M .  Fulstone, Efluent Trading: Legal Constraints on the lmpleqentation of Market- 
Based Efluent Trading Programs Under the Clean Water Act, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 459,48&89 (1995) (con- 
cluding that CWA amendment might be necessary before such trading would be allowed, citing, e.g., 
the antibacksliding provisions of 33 U.S.C. 9 1342(0)); see also Teitz, supra note 197, at 108,152 (con- 
cluding that CWA section 402(a)-(b), which require NPDES permits to specify effluent limitations 
unless elaborate modification procedures are met, "may significantly constrain the trading options cur- 
rently available"). Fulstone recommends that Congress enact a variance from the CWA's technology- 
based requirements for participants in qualified point source trading programs. See Fulstone, supra, at 
489. 
199. See U.S. EPA, GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS 
51 (EPA 44014-91-001 Apr. 1991); see also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d)(4)(A) (1994) (efflu- 
ent limitations based on TMDL may be revised if the water-quality standards will still be attained). 
200. See U.S. EPA, President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative 66-69 (EPA 800-R-94-001) (Feb. 
1994) <http://www.cleanwater.gov/>; Clean Water Act Plan, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,109 (1998). The Clean 
Water Initiative states that the EPA should: "(1) 'establish criteria. . . for prior approval of trades by' 
the permitting and administering authorities; (2) 'specify that trades [may] not violate water quality 
standards'; (3) 'specify that. . . trades based on TMDLs may. . . take place"' even though water- 
quality standards-have not been met; "(4) identify settings, based on mddels, that may complement 
trading programs when on-site monitoring would be otherwise prohibitively expensive; (5) 'clarify that 
the CWA's anti-backsliding provision . . . does not prohibit trading'; and (6) authorize pretreatment 
trading programs." Fulstone, supra note 198, at 462 n.8. 
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of ambient levels of "clean" water.20' In contrast, each individual point 
source must meet the technology-based effluent limitation applicable to 
its industrial category under the NPDES program, regardless of the 
quality of the receiving water body, and NPDES permits generally can- 
not be revised to contain less stringent standards under the antibackslid- 
ing provisions of the CWA.*02 
Even if effluent trading could be used in tandem with the NPDES 
program, it is not necessarily a desirable tool for regulating ballast-water 
discharges. Trading programs are not particularly useful when the goal is 
to achieve zero discharge;'03 there would be nothing left to trade. In ad- 
dition, tradable emission permits can exacerbate barriers to market ac- 
cess by new vessels and facilities and enhance the competitive edge of 
existing vessels through rent-seeking behavior during the allocation pro- 
~ e s s . ~ " ~  And while trading has worked well with respect to improving 
ambient air quality and reducing emissions from stationary sources like 
power plants, applying such a program to mobile ships, flying the flags of 
various nations and utilizing multiple trade routes in and through the 
Great Lakes, would be difficult at best.z05 
Finally, absent carefully designed geographic parameters, a trading 
program could result in "hot spots"206 where exotic species are more 
likely to be released or to gravitate. The Clean Air Act's acid rain pro- 
gram stands accused of facilitating trades to Midwestern utilities, allow- 
ing them to exceed their own sulfur dioxide allowances, thereby exacer- 
bating pollution problems in surrounding areaszo7 As a result of 
-. -. -. - - - 
201. Compare 33 U.S.C. Q 1313(d)(l)(C) (1994) (TMDLs shall be allocated to meet water-quality 
standards) with 42 U.S.C. $9 7409, 75M(c)(2) (1994) (state implementation plans must make "reason- 
able further progress" toward meeting National Ambient Air Quality Standards). 
202. See 33 U.S.C. J!j 1311(b), 1314(b), 1342(a)(1), (0). 
203. See id. Q 1251(a)(l). 
204. See Hirsch, supra note 196, at 358. Existing utilities benefited from the Clean Air Act 
scheme because sulfur dioxide allowances were initially allocated to them based on historic emission 
levels, but new utilities are required to purchase allowances to commence operations. Id. at 380. The 
concept of rent-seeking assumes that any ostensibly public-interest regulation that emerges from a 
political process must have been designed to favor concentrated interests, such as subgroups of the 
regulated industry attempting to burden their rivals. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political 
Economy of Global Environmenral Regulation, 87 CEO. L.J. 749, 754 (1999). In other words, "advo- 
cacy groups use environmental regulation, not to achieve general environmental quality improvement 
(a public good), but rather to deliver other more parochial ends (private goods)." Id at 755. For an 
assessment of whether the implementation of the Clean Air Act's trading program ultimately lends 
support to this theory, see Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market- 
Based Environmental Policy: The US. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37,81 (1998) (concluding 
that the actual allocation of allowances "appears more to  be a majoritarian equilibrium than one 
heavily weighted toward a narrowly defined set of economic or  geographical interests. It is not 
strongly consistent with the predictions of standard models of interest group politics"). 
205. See Driesen, supra note 170, at 3 (noting that "no international regime has an active allow- 
ance trading program in place," and discussing the failure to agree on trading "ground rules" in the 
climate change context). 
206. See Fulstone, supra note 198, at 480 n.109. Hot spots are generally described as concentra- 
tions of emissions within a particular geographic area. See Hirsch, supra note 196, at 393. 
207. See Burtraw & Swift, supra note 195, at 10,421 (suggesting that a subregional cap could be 
created for sensitive airsheds to address pollutant concentrations, but concluding that, "[iln the long 
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prevailing wind patterns, acid rain from these coal-fired power plants 
tends to fall in the northeast. Ironically, northeastern utilities, which are 
generally newer and cleaner, may end up fouling their own nest, so to 
speak, by selling their allowances to the very Midwestern utilities that 
send their excess sulfur dioxide emissions across state and regional lines. 
As a result, the pollution problem cannot be attributed directly to the 
power plant located in the affected area but instead to a distant source of 
pollution, minimizing incentives for community mobilization and local 
political pressure. 
This is not to say that economic tools, such as trading programs, or 
providing rebates for clean ballast or taxing dirty ballast, must be univer- 
sally rejected. The use of these and other types of economic initiatives 
should be explored in more detail, with appropriate consideration given 
to context, to determine their potential for enhancing- but not replac- 
ing- the underlying regulatory controls. 
C. Public Involvement and Enforcement 
The CWA permit program is all the more effective as a regulatory 
tool because it provides opportunities for public involvement as well as 
straightforward enforcement provisions, while economic initiatives gen- 
erally lack these features. Before a permit may issue, the EPA must al- 
low for public comment and determine that the discharge will comply 
with the applicable requirements of the CWA.20s Input received during 
the public comment period is included as part of the administrative rec- 
ord.209 At the close of the comment period, the Regional Administrator 
decides whether to issue or deny the permit.210 Any interested person 
may request a formal hearing within thirty days of the Administrator's 
determinati~n.~'~ These opportunities for involvement at various levels 
of the decision making process assist the EPA in reaching a well- 
informed decision, based not only on agency data but also on research 
and opinions by interested parties, who often have vastly different per- 
spectives. 
term, an [overall national] emission cap system may do more for such sensitive regions because pollut- 
ant loads do not increase with economic growth"); Kirsten Engel & Scott Saleska, Don't Trade Away 
Benefits of Clean Air, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 2000, at A15 (suggesting that geographic constraints 
on trading may be appropriate, along with reductions in the overall sulfur dioxide cap, to avoid hot- 
spot problems in thenortheast); see &o Hirsch, supra note 196, at 373-74 (describing positions of in- 
terested parties during congressional debates on sulfur dioxide trading program). 
208. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1) (1994); 40 C.F.R. 9 124.12(c) (1999). States that have assumed 
delegated authority to administer the program also must allow opportunities for public input before 
ruling on permit applications. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3); 40 C.F.R. g 123.25. 
209. See 40 C.F.R. $$ 124.10,124.12(a)(4). 
210. See id. 5 124.15. 
211. See id. 4 124.74(a). 
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Once a permit is in place, the CWA provides for enforcement 
through temporary or permanent injunctions, administrative, civil and 
criminal penalties, and citizen suits.212 
This straightforward and effective enforcement scheme, in which 
the permit holder must report on and be held accountable for its 
compliance with its permit and which provides multiple opportuni- 
ties for enforcement, including by citizens, did not come about by 
accident. Congress consciously mandated an aggressive, effective 
enforcement system when it drafted the Clean Water Act, provid- 
ing, for example, for citizen suits. During Senate consideration of 
the conference report in 1972, Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) said: "We 
have learned by disappointing experience, Mr. President, that with- 
out strict enforcement and meaningful deterrents, water pollution 
control laws will have no real effect. The bill before us provides the 
enforcement and deterrents we need."213 
Under section 309, the EPA can assess administrative penalties in 
an amount up to $10,000 for each violation of a statutory or permit provi- 
~ i o n . ~ ' ~  If a judicial proceeding is initiated, civil penalties up to $25,000 
per day for each violation may be assessed.215 First time offenders who 
either negligently or knowingly violate a statutory or permit provision 
can be assessed with criminal fines up to $25,000 per day of violations 
and imprisonment for not more than one year, or $50,000 per day and 
imprisonment for not more than three years, re~pectively.~'~ Fines go up, 
as does the duration of potential jail time, if the violator is a repeat of- 
fender, or knows that the violation puts another person in imminent dan- 
ger of death or serious bodily inj~ry.~" 
In addition, section 505 authorizes citizen suits "against any per- 
son . . . who is alleged to be in violation o f .  . . an effluent standard or 
limitation under this chapter."218 Successful plaintiffs can recoup their 
attorneys' fees and In enacting section 505, Congress recognized, 
at least implicitly, that watchful citizens would be especially effective ad- 
~ocates.*~O As a result of citizen-suit provisions like those found in the 
212. See 33 U.S.C. §$ 1319,1365. 
213. Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, [I9971 27 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,574, 10,580 n.82 (Nov. 1997) (citing 1 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGIS- 
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 216 (Comrn. 
Print compiled for the Senate Comrn. on Pub. Works 1973)). 
214. See 33 U.S.C. 9 1319(g)(2). States with approved programs are also given the authority to 
assess penalties. See id. $9 1319(a), 1342(b)(7). 
215. See id. 9 1319(b), (d). 
216. See id. 0 1319(c)(l)-(2). 
217. See id. 0 1319(c)(l)-(3). 
218. Id. $ 1365(a)(l). An "effluent standard or limitation" is defined as, among other things, an 
unlawful act under CWA section 301(a). Id. !j 1365(f). 
219. See id. 8 1365(d). 
220. See WILLIAM H .  RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 271 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that Con- 
gress, through various provisions of the CWA, encouraged "citizen initiatives to enforce the water 
pollution laws"); see also Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, 
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CWA, litigation has played a significant, and even dominant, role in 
American environmental policy and law.221 The list of citizen suits that 
have impacted- the way business is done in the United States is impres- 
sive, ranging from ConEdison's thwarted plan to build a huge hydroelec- 
tric facility on Storm King Mountain, to the Tennessee Valley Author- 
ity's confrontation with the infamous snail darter, to Disney 's failed 
attempts to build a ski resort in an isolated valley of the Sequoia Na- 
tional Forest.222 
Citizen suits provide a vehicle for enforcement where the EPA has 
been unwilling or unable to move forward due to lack of resources or 
lack of political fortitude.223 They are especially important to ensure the 
implementation of politically charged programs like water-quality stan- 
dards and pollutant allocations for nonpoint sources, many of which re- 
quire changes in local land use planning. For example, the TMDL re- 
quirement for addressing impaired water bodies was virtually ignored by 
the EPA and the states until a series of citizen suits forced compliance.224 
It is fair to say that, without citizen enforcement, most environ- 
mental programs would have "languish[ed] under the political con- 
straints of the marketplace."225 If not checked by aggressive enforce- 
ment, particularly by citizens, industry almost inevitably bows to the 
pressure to pollute: noncompliance yields direct economic benefits 
through the free use of water for waste disposal, while compliance, re- 
Part I ,  [I9831 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,309, 10,310-11 (Oct. 1983) (detailing legislative his- 
tory of citizens' suits provisions). 
221. See Claudia Polsky & Tom Turner, Justice on the Rampage, 21 AMICUS J .  34 (1999). "One of 
the greatest elements of the U.S. system of environmental law, itself arguably the greatest in the world, 
is the citizen lawsuit." Id. 
222. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608,624- 
25 (2d Cir. 1965) (setting aside and remanding a Federal Power Commission license to construct 
pumped-storage hydroelectric project at Storm King); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 
193-95 (1978) (enjoining construction of Tellico dam). In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,740-41 
(1972). the Court held that the Sierra Club did not have standing because it failed to allege that either 
the organization or its members would be affected by Disney's proposed ski resort. In the end, how- 
ever, the resort was never actually built. See RODCERS, supra note 220, at 209 n.12. 
223. See Michael D. Axline & Patrick C. McGinley, Universal Statutes and Planetary Programs: 
How EPA Has Diluted the Clean Water Act, 8 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG. 253, 287-88 (1993); Michael R. 
Lozeau, Tailoring Citizen Enforcement to an Expanding Clean Water Act: The San Francisco 
Baykeeper Model, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429, 440 (1998) (describing role of NRDC in CWA 
enforcement during diminished role of Reagan administration's EPA). 
224. See Houck, supra note 117 at 10,395-97. 
225. Plater, supra note 129, at 382-83 11.54; see JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE 
RIVERKEEPERS: N O  A ~ I V I S T S  FlGHTTO RECLAIM OUR ENVIRONMENT AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT 
177-99 (1997) (discussing need for citizen enforcement in light of underenforcement by federal and 
state environmental agencies due to "agency capture" by regulated industry, political pressure, and 
budget shortfalls); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985). 
"Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but 
rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests." Id (quoting Friends of 
the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165,172 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
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quiring the construction and operation of expensive pollution removal 
facilities, imposes hefty financial costs.226 
In comparison, economic initiatives, whether in the form of subsi- 
dies or taxation, generally inhibit citizen involvement. Citizens, as tax- 
payers, often have difficulty establishing standing to challenge federal 
spending programs in court.227 In Massachusetts v. Mel10n,2~' a taxpayer 
alleged that Congress, in enacting the Maternity Act of 1921, had ex- 
ceeded the spending power of Article I, Section 8, depriving her of prop- 
erty without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and had 
invaded the legislative powers reserved to the states by the Tenth 
Amendment.229 The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had no 
standing to bring these general grievances about the conduct of govern- 
ment or the balance of power in the federal Unless a taxpayer 
alleges a violation of a specific constitutional limitation on the spending 
power, such as the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the 
challenge to a governmental tax or subsidy will be dismissed.231 Public- 
interest plaintiffs challenging economic programs applicable to ballast- 
water discharges would most likely allege arbitrary and capricious action 
under the EPA,232 but such plaintiffs would presumably lack standing?33 
In sum, bringing ballast-water discharges into the CWA program 
would result in almost immediate improvement. The CWA's provisions 
for hefty civil and criminal penalties, along with citizen suits with attor- 
ney fee awards, provide powerful incentives for dischargers to improve 
operations as soon as possible.234 At the same time, the opportunity for 
both industry and environmental interest groups to challenge EPA deci- 
sions in court provides a tremendous incentive for the agency to equita- 
bly and reasonably balance competing interests and embrace effective, 
yet practical, solutions.235 
226. See CRONIN & KENNEDY, supra note 225, at 178; cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693,707 (2000) (discussing deterrent effect of CWA civil-penalty 
awards). 
227. See U.S. CONST. art. I11 (providing federal courts with jurisdiction to hear only cases or con- 
troversies). 
228. 262 U.S. 447,479 (1923). 
229. See id. 
230. See id. at 480. 
231. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (noting that "one of the specific evils feared by 
those who drafted the Establishment Clause . . . was that the taxing and spending power would be used 
to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general"). 
232. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). 
233. Challenges to economic incentive programs almost routinely are rejected for lack of stand- 
ing, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 2 6 , 6 4 5  (1976); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 753 (1984), unless the plaintiff is directly affected as either a recipient of the subsidy in question, 
see Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1996), or suffers competitive disadvantage due 
to the program, see Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591,594 (7th Cir. 1995). 
234. See Rodgers, supra note 117, at 1012, 1020-21 (noting that one of the reasons for the CWA's 
successes in reducing water pollution is its effective system of monitoring, underscored by a highly ef- 
fective citizen suit mechanism). 
235. "Judicial review is one reason American environmental law works, and the quite similar laws 
of other countries do not." Houck, supra note 109, at 467. 
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V. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF N P D E S  PERMITTING FOR 
VESSELS 
The regulation of ballast-water discharges through N P D E S  permits 
will, no doubt, present a challenge, in part because the E P A  does not 
have the expertise in regulating ships that it does regulating industrial 
dischargers. As a result, shipping companies and trade groups, accus- 
tomed to dealing with national coast guards and port authorities, will be 
resistant when the E P A  jumps into the existing regulatory fray. 
The more significant obstacle to effective ballast-water management 
arises from the fact that commercial cargo ships are, by their very nature, 
mobile, and not only originate from various nations but also frequently 
cross jurisdictional lines. The C W A  framework, where the E P A  typically 
delegates the NPDES permitting responsibilities to the states, each of 
which may exercise authority over a vessel "point source" crossing 
through its waters, poses special concerns when it comes to shipping. 
Disparities among interested states are quite possible, because although 
states cannot dip below the federal thresholds, each individual state can 
impose more stringent controls than the effluent limitations established 
by the EPA.236 
The logistical difficulties inherent in regulating vessels and their 
ballast-water discharges do not provide the E P A  with an excuse to avoid 
regulation altogether. Courts have flatly rejected the notion that "ad- 
ministrative impossibility" justifies a refusal to require NPDES permits 
for categories of point source dis~hargers.'~~ Instead, the E P A  must re- 
quire permits, but the C W A  "gives [the] E P A  considerable flexibility in 
framing the permit to achieve a desired reduction in pollutant dis- 
c h a r g e ~ . " ~ ~ ~  Accordingly, the E P A  might opt for gross reductions in 
pollutant discharges from a category of vessels, rather than engage in the 
fine-tuning necessitated when numerical effluent limitations are incorpo- 
rated in individual permits. "But this ambitious statute is not hospitable 
to the concept that the appropriate response to a difficult pollution 
problem is not to try at 
Even if the EPA initially addressed the problem of ballast-water 
discharges by using a general-permit approach,240 performance would 
improve. General permits, addressed to a class of point source discharg- 
ers or a particular area or region, allow for public participation and re- 
quire the E P A  to focus on the effects of a region or category of activities 
- 
236. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1370 (1994); 40 C.F.R. 5 122.l(f) (1999); see also O'Toole, 
supra note 84, at 45 (discussing the Navy's difficulties in complying with disparate state standards, and 
noting that "no state has yet required the permitting of a U.S. Navy ship, though individual discharges 
are being increasingly challenged"). 
237. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,1383 (D.C. Cir. 1977). . 
238. Id. at 1380. 
239. Id. 
240. See 40 C.F.R. $122.28. 
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and to revisit the issue every five years or less.241 In comparison, an ex- 
emption like section 122.3242 "tends to become indefinite: the problem 
drops out of sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be recalled in the ab- 
sence of crisis or a strong political protagonist."243 
A. Efluent Limitations for New and Existing Vessels 
NPDES permits must include technology-based effluent limita- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~ ~  water-quality-related effluent limitations and water-quality stan- 
dards, and ocean-discharge criteria.245 Effluent limitations vary according 
to type of pollutant emitted, and whether the discharger is a new or ex- 
isting source. 
As discussed above, new sources are generally subject to the strict- 
est standard of the CWA, the "best available demonstrated control tech- 
nology" (BADT)F6 regardless of the type of pollutants emitted. Pursu- 
ant to section 306, BADT performance standards require the greatest 
degree of effluent reduction achievable through the application of the 
best demonstrated technology for an industrial class.247 The BADT stan- 
dard can force changes in operating methods, processes or other alterna- 
tives, "including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge 
of pollutants."248 Because new sources have the opportunity to install the 
best and most efficient production processes and wastewater-treatment 
technologies, generally at lower cost than retrofitting existing facilities, 
BADT "should represent the most stringent numerical values attainable 
through the application of the best available control technology" for all 
types of pollutants.249 
A source is considered "new" if construction began after proposed 
regulations establishing performance standards for the relevant category 
of sources are published.250 BADT has only been prescribed for a limited 
- 
241. See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1382; see, e-g., Final NPDES General Permits for Storm 
Water Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,236 (1992) (providing for gen- 
eral permits for storm water discharges, and requiring facilities to "implement a site-specific storm 
water pollution prevention plan"; however, if storm water discharges in a particular watershed or from 
particular facilities or industries are found to cause water-quality problems, watershed-specific or 
other individualized permits may be required). 
242. See 40 C.F.R. 5 122.3. 
243. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1382. 
244. See 40 C.F.R. 9 122.2 (defining effluent limitations as "[alny restriction imposed by the Di- 
rector on quantities, discharge rates, and concentrations of 'pollutants' which are 'discharged' from 
'point sources' into 'waters of the United States,' the waters of the 'contiguous zone,' or the ocean"). 
245. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(a)-(c) (1994). The Administrator can also set "other 
requirements as he deems appropriate." Id. 5 1342(a)(2). 
246. Id. 9 1316(a)(l). 
247. See id. 0 1316(a)(l). 
248. Id. 
249. Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment 
Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,388,50,390 (1998) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 136,439). 
250. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1316(a)(2). 
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number of industrial categories, many of which are explicitly listed in sec- 
tion 306.251 The EPA is directed to revise the list of categories governed 
by BADT "from time to time.""2 
The EPA, in all likelihood, could include commercial vessels as a 
category to be governed by BADT, although it is not entirely clear that 
section 306 was intended to apply to mobile sources.253 Section 306 de- 
fines a source as "any building, structure, facility, or installation from 
which there is or may be the discharge of pollutants."254 The inclusion of 
mobile sources within the terms "building" and "facility" would render a 
rather strained reading of section 306, given the plain and ordinary 
meaning of those terms.255 On the other hand, a vessel could be consid- 
ered an "installation" or a "structure," as both terms seem broad enough 
to include any physical or operational system of parts or apparat~s."~ 
An analogous provision of the Clean Air Act, section 111, expressly 
states that its new-source-review program is applicable only to "station- 
ary indicating that Congress knew how to limit the applica- 
tion of more stringent requirements to new stationary sources when it 
wanted to. The Clean Air Act, however, defines the term "stationary 
source" in precisely the same manner as the CWA defines the term 
"source": "any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or 
may emit any air pollutant."258 These comparable definitional sections 
arguably show that a new source is meant to include only stationary 
-- -  
251. See id. 8 1316(b)(l)(A) (including pulp and paper mills, meat product and rendering proc- 
essing, grain mills, and other types of industrial facilities). 
252. Id. 8 1316 (b)(l)(B). 
253. See Ore Mining and Dressing; Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 53 
Fed. Reg. 18,764, 18,775 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 440) (stating that the EPA initially be- 
lieved that the new source criteria were not designed to address mobile operations); Consolidated 
Permit Regulations; NPDES New Dischargers, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,391 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 122, 124) (the EPA suspending a portion of the final rule Oct. 15, 1980, and suspending NPDES 
"new discharger" requirements for mobile drilling rigs operating in certain offshore areas). 
254. 33 U.S.C. $1316(a)(3). 
255. The broader term, "facility," is generally known as "something.. . that is built [or] in- 
stalled". . . "to serve a particular purpose." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 444 
(Merriam-Webster Inc. 1991). Facilities are defined by regulation as "buildings, structures, process or 
production equipment or machinery which form a permanent part of the new source and which will be 
used in its operation." 40 C.F.R. Q 122.29(a)(5) (1999). Arguably, "process or production equipment 
and machinery" could encompass mobile sources, if they "form a permanent part of the new source." 
However, other provisions of the CWA provide separate and distinct definitions for vessels and facili- 
ties, indicating that the two terms should not be used interchangeably. See 33 U.S.C. Q 1321(a)(3), 
(10)-(11). Under section 311, which addresses discharges of oil and hazardous substances, vessels lo- 
cated in, on, or under waters of the United States or under U.S. jurisdiction are excluded from the 
definition of "offshore facility." Id. 8 1321(11). 
256. A structure is generally defined as "something made up of a number of parts that are held or 
put together in a particular way." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1208 (2d ed. 1985). An 
installation is defined, in pertinent part, as "[a] system of machinery or other apparatus set up for use." 
Id. at 666. However, the EPA has taken a more narrow view of the term installation on at least one 
occasion. See 40 C.F.R. 9 61.141 (defining "installation," for purposes of the Clean Air Act's National 
Emission Standards for asbestos, as "any building or structure or any group of buildings or structures 
at a single demolition or renovation site that are under the control of the same owner or operator"). 
257. Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. Q 7411(a)(2), (b)(l)(A) (1994). 
258. Id. 0 7411(a)(3). 
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sources for the purposes of both statutes.259 Yet the express limitation to 
stationary air sources makes sense in light of the overall structure of the 
Clean Air Act, which includes an entirely separate program for the 
regulation of mobile sources.260 To imply such a limitation in the context 
of the CWA is less plausible, given that the CWA addresses both sta- 
tionary and mobile point sources through the NPDES program.26' 
In fact, the EPA has issued BADT standards for two categories of 
sources that are at least somewhat mobile: offshore oil and gas extrac- 
tion a~tivities*~~ and placer Placer mines, where particles of pre- 
259. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Ap- 
proval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,696 (1980) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 124) [hereinafter Requirements for Preparation]. The EPA stated that "to 
treat all of the activities of a ship [as a stationary source] while it is coming to, staying at, and going 
from a terminal would violate any common sense notion of 'building,' 'structure,' 'facility,' or 'installa- 
tion."' Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the EPA concluded that marine terminals must include only 
ship emissions from "stationary" activities, such as dockside loading and unloading, in determining 
whether the terminal itself is a "major" source under the Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) program, 42 U.S.C. Ps747CL7479. See 42 U.S.C. $ 7410(a)(5); see also NRDC v. 
EPA, 725 F.2d 761, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the EPA must consider the relationship be- 
tween vessels and terminals to determine which vessel emissions are stationary in nature so that they 
would be attributed to the terminals and included in the State Implementation Plans). 
260. Title I1 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. $5 7521-7590, regulates emissions from mobile 
sources, while Title I governs emissions from stationary sources. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. $9 
7401-7515. This is not to say that overlap between the two programs is completely precluded by the 
Clean Air Act; for instance, Title I addresses "indirect sources" like parking garages, which result in 
increased air emissions due to the concentration of vehicles. See id. 5 741O(a)(S)(C); Sierra Club v. 
Larson, 2 F.3d 462,468 (1st Cir. 1993). Further, mobile sources can be considered stationary sources 
under the Clean Air Act when they emit pollutants in the course of activities that are stationary in na- 
ture, for example, ships that emit particulate dust during dockside loading operations. See Require- 
ments for Preparation, supra note 259, at  52,696; see also Sierra Club, 2 F.3d at 468 (discussing 42 
U.S.C. § 7602(z), which generally excludes internal combustion engines used for transportation pur- 
poses from the definition of stationary source). Likewise, even though the EPA currently excludes 
incidental discharges from vessels from the NPDES program, it does regulate seafood processing 
plants as point sources when they are acting in a capacity other than transportation. See Final General 
NPDES Permit for Seafood Processors in the State Waters of Alaska and in Receiving Waters Adja- 
cent to Alaska and Extending Out 200 Nautical Miles from the Coast and Baseline of Alaska: Alaska 
Seafood Processors General NPDES Permit (No. AKG-52-0000), 60 Fed. Reg. 34,991 (1995) (notice 
of final general permit July 5,1995); Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794,806 n.7,815 
(9th Cir. 1980). 
261. Courts have consistently held that mobile sources like dump trucks and bulldozers can qual- 
ify as "point sources" under the CWA. See United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719,726 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,922 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Alameda County 
Assessor's Parcel Nos., 672 F. Supp. 1278,1284-85 (N.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 
610, 622 (E.D. Va. 1983), aJfd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 
(1987); see also Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114,119 (2d Cir. 
1994) (finding that vehicles used to spread manure are point sources). 
262. See Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category, Offshore Subcategory; Effluent Limita- 
tions Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards, 50 Fed. Reg. 34,591,34,617-19 (1985) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435) (proposed Aug. 26, 1985) (proposed regulations for offshore activities, 
finding that the term "facilities" includes mobile drilling rigs placed at a drilling site, as well as produc- 
tion structures, platforms, and equipment); see also Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category; 
Offshore Subcategory Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards, 58 
Fed. Reg. 12,454 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435) (establishing effluent limitations and per- 
formance standards for offshore oil and gas extraction activities). The final rule was upheld in BP Ex- 
ploration & Oil, Inc, v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784,804 (6th Cir. 1995). 
No. 41 VIRTUES OF "COMMAND AND CONTROL" REGULATION 1273 
cious metals are extracted from alluvial or glacial deposits, are frequkntly 
moved up and down a stream by the miner in search of "pay dirt.'7264 
Without directly addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
EPA's application of new-source-performance standards to placer 
mines,26s though such activities could be considered more mobile than 
stationary in nature. The inclusion of new vessels as "sources" would 
probably be upheld as well, as a reasonable interpretation of section 
306.266 
BADT would surely require improved exchange rates for new ves- 
sels, and would most likely require alternative treatment strategies as 
Several promising technologies are currently being explored: 
shore side treatment at POTWs; ultraviolet light; micro-filtration; ozona- 
tion; environmentally friendly biocides; and temperature (heat).268 The 
Canadian vessel Algonorth, with support from the Great Lakes Protec- 
tion Fund, the Lake Carrier's Association and the Northeast Midwest In- 
stitute, is implementing a demonstration project utilizing a filter that can 
trap particles as small as twenty-five microns.269 This would eliminate 
aquatic vertebrates, fish eggs, and mussel veliger larvae, along with most 
invertebrate eggs, fungi, and algae With additional treatment, 
such as ultraviolet light or biocides, even smaller bacteria and viruses 
could be eradi~ated.~ '~  
263. See Ore Mining and Dressing; Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pre- 
treatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. 18,764 (1988) (to be codi- 
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 440) (final rule regarding effluent limitations and performance standards for ex- 
isting and new gold placer mines). By law, placer mines include "all forms of [mineral] deposit, 
excepting veins of quartz or other rock in place." 30 U.S.C. 5 22 (1994); see Earl M. Hill, A Brief His- 
tory of the Nevada Law of Mining, NEV. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 12,13 (describing placer deposits). 
264. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 18,774. 
265. See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the EPA's inclu- 
sion of placer mines as a regulated category under CWA section 306, as codified at 33 U.S.C. 9 1316 
(1994)). 
266. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that courts must 
affirm reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms by an agency charged with imple- 
menting the statute). 
267. Proposed amendments to NISA appear to require something like BADT. See supra notes 
46-47 and accompanying text. Similarly, state legislation in several coastal states would require sterili- 
zation of ballast water before ships could enter their waters. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying 
text. 
268. See Foster, supra note 16, at 115-16 nn.121-24 (discussing success of various experimental 
treatment alternatives, and, in particular, assessing expert opinions regarding shipboard versus on- 
shore treatment); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, $ 3.7 (assessing relative merits and costs of im- 
proved ballast exchange, filtering, ultraviolet light, biocides, heat, and on-shore treatment). 
269. See Managing Ballast Water to Stop the Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species (visited July 
16,2000) ~http://www.lcaships.cornlhpbw.html> [hereinafter Managing Ballast Water] (on l5le with the 
University of Illinois Law Review). 
270. See Allegra Cangelosi et al., The Biological Effectiveness of Filtration as an On-Board Ballast 
Treatment Technology (1999) (visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.nemw.org/abstracts.htm> (on file 
with the University of Illinois Law Review); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3,  § 3.7. 
271. See Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, 5 3.7. The Algonorth project, however, filters only 
1,500 gallons per minute; U.S. lakers, carrying as much as 14 million gallons of ballast water when 
"light" on cargo, could require filtration up to 18,000 gallons per minute. See Managing Ballast Water, 
supra note 269, at 3; Allegra Cangelosi, The Algonorth Experiment, 25 SEAWAY REVIEW 29, 29-33 
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Of course, the EPA need not be "fully cognizant of every innova- 
tion, wherever employed," but it is arbitrary and capricious to consider 
only those technologies that are widely available.272 For example, the 
EPA has been required to consider zero discharge as the BADT stan- 
dard for the organic chemicals, plastics, and synthetic fibers industries 
where several plants, utilizing recycling technologies, had already elimi- 
nated their discharges.273 Yet BADT would not necessarily require new 
vessels to meet standards as stringent as those achieved utilizing the fil- 
ters employed on the Algonorth until filtering technology has been dem- 
onstrated as available for the size and type of tanker in question. 
Effluent limitations for existing facilities and vessels vary according 
to the type of pollutant discharged. Existing sources of conventional 
pollutants, such as suspended solids and fecal coliform, must meet the 
best conventional technology (BCT) for their industrial class.274 In com- 
parison, existing sources of toxic and nonconventional pollutants are re- 
quired to meet effluent limitations based on the more stringent BAT 
Toxic pollutants are those that, upon exposure, may cause serious, 
adverse human-health effects.276 Nonconventional pollutants comprise a 
"catch-all" category of pollutants- those that are not toxic or conven- 
t i0na1.~~~ Congress explicitly listed several nonconventional pollutants, 
such as chlorine, ammonia, and color, as well as the thermal component 
of dis~harges,~~' and gave the EPA authority to list additional noncon- 
~ e n t i o n a l s . ~ ~ ~  
(Jan.-Mar. 1997). A demonstration project utilizing a Voraxial Separator unit capable of processing 
4,500 gpm has recently gained the support of the U.S. Maritime Administration and the National Oce- 
anic and Atmospheric Administration for implementation onboard the "Cape May" in the Baltimore 
area. See Enviro Voraxial Maritime Solutions win support of MARAD, 11 Int'l Env't 9, 2000 WL 
7448642 (09/01/00). 
272. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177,263 (5th Cir. 1989). 
273. See id. at 264; Houck, supra note 109, at 452 (noting that the EPA's final standard for organic 
chemicals and plastics could hardly be called the best available demonstrated technology, where the 
EPA failed to recognize that recycling technologies adopted by a number of plants had already 
achieved zero discharge). 
274. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Q 1314(a)(4) (1994). The CWA lists the following conven- 
tional pollutants: biochemical oxygen-demanding pollutants (BOD), like nitrogen and phosphorous; 
total suspended solids (TSS); fecal coliform; and pH. See id. 5 1314(a)(4). The EPA subsequently 
designated oil as an additional conventional pollutant on July 30, 1979. See Identification of Conven- 
tional Pollutants, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,501,44,501 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 401). Conventionals are 
generally oxygen demanding and eutrophying, or contribute to turbidity. See Development of Water 
Quality-Based Permit Limitations for Toxic Pollutants; National Policy, 49 Fed. Reg. 9016, 9017 
(1 984). 
275. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b)(l), (g)(l). 
276. See id. Q 1362(13) (defining toxic pollutants as those that, upon exposure, may cause "death, 
disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including 
malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organism or their offspring"). Toxic 
water pollutants are listed pursuant to section 307. See id. $ 1317. 
277. See id. 5 1311(b)(2)(F), (g)(l), (g)(4). 
278. See id. 9 1311(g)(l), (g)(4). 
279. See id. $1311(b)(2)(F). 
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Although some components of ballast-water discharges, such as 
suspended solids, would be considered conventional pollutants, biologi- 
cal materials, including exotic species, would likely fall under the catch- 
all category of nonconventional pollutants subject to BAT. If the EPA 
were to characterize exotics as nonconventionals, that determination 
would be accorded judicial deference as a reasonable interpretation of 
the s t a t ~ t e . ~  
BAT generally requires that existing technology utilized by the 
"cleanest" firms in the industry be adopted.281 In setting BAT, the EPA 
takes into account engineering technology and operational processes for 
categories and subcategories of industry.282 Although BAT is established 
with reference to the "best" technology, it does not require the regulated 
facility to adopt any one particular technology. Instead, individual dis- 
chargers may choose their own abatement technique as long as the efflu- 
ent levels specified in their permits are met.283 
In addition, as with BADT, the EPA is to consider the costs of 
achieving the best technology available, and any non-water-quality im- 
pacts as well as energy requirements, in setting BAT.284 The EPA retains 
considerable discretion in assigning the weight to be given these fac- 
t o r ~ . ~ ~ ~  Although costs play a role in setting BAT, unlike the BCT limita- 
tion for conventional pollutants,286 the EPA need not perform a cost- 
benefit analysis or otherwise justify its choice of BAT on economic 
grounds as long as it has determined that the costs can be borne by indus- 
try.2n That the technology is in fact available provides evidence that 
280. See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276,1292 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the "EPA's decision 
to treat settleable solids as a nonconventional pollutant and thus subject to BAT standards was both 
reasonable and permissible"). The court noted that "even if settleable solids should more properly be 
considered a conventional pollutant,. . . [the] EPA has determined that settleable solids in placer 
mining effluent are a toxic pollutant indicator and thus may be subject to BAT-level limitations." Id.; 
see also American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 262, 263 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding EPA's 
designation of diesel oil as nonconventional "indicator" pollutant, resulting in imposition of more 
stringent BAT regulations over discharge of muds and cuttings contaminated with diesel oil for use in 
offshore drilling operations). 
281. See Houck, supra note 109, at 451. 
282. See 33 U.S.C. 80 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2)(B); Houck, supra note 109. at 445 n.188. 
283. See Thompson, supra note 118, at 522. 
284. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). 
285. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177,204-07 (5th Cir. 1989). 
286. BCT is roughly equivalent to the "best of the average" performers in an industrial category. 
BCT limitations are established in light of a variety of factors, including a two-part, "cost- 
reasonableness" test. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1314(b)(4)(B); American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954,960- 
61 (4th Cir. 1981). The EPA's current methodology for the development of BCT limitations was is- 
sued in 1986. See Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 
51 Fed. Reg. 24$974 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 405-409,411,412,418,422,424,426,432). 
287. See Chemicai Mfrs. Ass'n, 870 F.2d at 250 n.320 (citing EPA v. National Crushed Stone, 449 
U.S. 64 (1980)). Section 304(b)(2)(B) "does not state that costs shall be considered in relation to ef- 
fluent reduction." EPA v. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. 64,71 n.10 (1980). 
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costs can be borne by the industry. Most facilities have been able to 
comply with BAT at a reasonable 
BAT does not require turning a blind eye toward differences among 
facilities within industrial categories and among geographical areas. The 
EPA has the authority to grant variances or modifications to account for 
operational differences and even economic hardship.289 Section 301(g)290 
authorizes a waiver from BAT requirements for nonconventional pollut- 
ants if the applicant can demonstrate that its proposed modified effluent 
limitation is equal to or more stringent than both the applicable water- 
quality standards and the initial standard required under the CWA, i.e., 
the "best practicable control technology currently available7' 
The applicant also must show that the modification will not result in ad- 
ditional requirements for other sources, and that it will not impair the in- 
tegrity of the receiving water or pose unacceptable risks to the environ- 
ment or human health.292 
In addition, section 301(c) gives the EPA authority to modify BAT 
for a facility or vessel upon a showing that modified requirements will: 
(1) represent the maximum use of technology within the economic capa- 
bility of the owner or operator, and (2) result in reasonable further prog- 
ress toward the elimination of pollutant discharge.293 Section 301(n) also 
allows variances if the facility demonstrates that it is fundamentally dif- 
ferent than other facilities within its industrial category with respect to 
the relevant factors used in establishing effluent limitations.294 
The imposition of BAT would force existing vessels to achieve bet- 
ter exchange rates, and might, in time, require alternative technologies to 
minimize the potential for introducing exotics through ballast discharges. 
There is reason to believe that existing vessels can do much better than 
the eighty-five percent exchange rate referenced in NISA, as would be 
necessary if BAT applied. In fact, the Coast Guard has indicated that 
ninety percent is an achievable rate of exchange for existing vessels.295 
Other estimates range as high as ninety-eight percent as a "reasonably 
high" exchange standard.296 
288. See Shapiro & McGarity. supra note 123. at 744 11.80; Percival, Regularory Evolution, supra 
note 153. at 180. 
289. See, e.g.. 33 U.S.C. $ 1311(c), (g), (h). 
290. See id. 0 131 1 (g). 
291. See id. 5 1311. 
292. See id. 5 131 1(g) 
293. See id. 5 1311(c). 
294. See id. 0 1311(n). The CWA also allows waivers for dischargers that use "innovative tech- 
nology," so long as their control method has potential for industrywide use and advances the CWA's 
goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants. See id. 0 1311(k). This section waives compliance with 
otherwise applicable standards for up to two years. See id.; see also Derzko, supra note 187, at 30. 
295. See Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 63 Fed. Reg. 
17,782. 17,785-89 (1998) (to be codified at 33 D.F.R. pt. 151) (notice of proposed rulemaking Apr. 10, 
1998). 
296. See Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies, supra note 20, at 66. 
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The CWAYs effluent limitations also would apply to NOBOBs. The 
vessel itself is the regulated point source, regardless of the quantity of 
ballast water; therefore, BADT and BAT would be set for NOBOBs just 
as they would be for other vessels. BAT might require NOBOB vessels 
to "swish and spit" by lightening their cargo by an amount allowing an 
influx of enough water to pump out the residues.29? Other suggested 
treatment methods for sediment and slop in a NOBOB tank include 
chemical biocides and heat.298 Regardless, treatment would be required 
prior to discharge into U.S. waters, regardless of whether a vessel en- 
tered fully loaded or not. 
B. Water-Quality Standards 
In addition to technology-based effluent limitations, permit re- 
quirements must be ratcheted up if necessary to meet water-quality stan- 
d a r d ~ . ~ ~ ~  Water-quality standards are generally adopted by the states, 
based on EPA guidelines and subject to EPA Section 303(c) 
requires that state water-quality standards "protect the public health or 
welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this 
[Act,] . . . taking into consideration their use and value for. . . propaga- 
tion of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, indus- 
trial, and other 
Under section 303(c), a water-quality standard consists of two com- 
ponents: designated uses for which the particular water body is to be 
protected such as recreation, protection and propagation of fish and 
wildlife, or agricultural uses; and water-quality criteria to support those 
uses.302 Each state must identify and submit a list of waters for which ex- 
isting technology-based pollution controls are not stringent enough to at- 
tain or maintain water-quality standards, and the EPA must approve or 
disapprove the lists pursuant to section 303(d)."03 For waters identified as 
water-quality impaired, states are required to establish Total Maximum 
Daily Loads (TMDLs) for problem pollutants as necessary to satisfy ap- 
plicable water-quality standards with an adequate margin of safety.304 
California has listed several water bodies as impaired due to the presence 
297. This operation only would require approximately 1.5% reduction in cargo. See id. at 55. 
298. Seeid. 
299. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(C) ("[Tlhere shall be achieved. . . any more 
stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards . . . established pursuant 
to any State law or regulations . . . ."). 
300. See id. $3 1314(a), 1313(c). 
301. Id. 5 1313(c). The ultimate purpose of water-quality standards, like other provisions of the 
CWA, is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa- 
ters." Id. s 1251(a). 
302. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (1999). Water-quality criteria may be numeric or narrative. See id. 
303. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). 
304. See id. § 1313(d)(l)(C). 
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of exotic species.305 Theoretically, any permitted discharge into these im- 
paired waters would be required to attain zero discharge of exotics to 
avoid further degradation and to protect designated uses.306 
A few coastal states have addressed exotic species by enacting sepa- 
rate regulatory programs altogether. Both California and Washington 
have adopted fairly aggressive programs for regulating ballast water.M7 
After July 1, 2002, the discharge of ballast water into Washington state 
waters is authorized only if there has been an open-sea exchange or if the 
vessel has treated its ballast water to meet standards set by the Depart- 
ment of Fish and Wildlife.* Washington law imposes monitoring and 
reporting requirements, with sampling and testing protocols to be deter- 
mined by the Department by rule.309 Other coastal states are beginning 
to move in this direction. In Michigan, a bill is pending to require vessels 
to obtain permits from the Department of Environmental Quality, and to 
mandate that ballast water be one hundred percent purified through 
sterilization before entering Michigan  water^.^" New York representa- 
tives have introduced a similar 
State programs that pose a danger of defeating federal CWA objec- 
tives might be preempted under the Supremacy Cla~se ."~  They also may 
305. See Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Availability of List Submissions and Proposed Deci- 
sions, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,556. 
306. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d)(4)(A); Foster, supra note 16, at 114-15. 
307. See H.B. 2466,56th Leg., 2d Sess (Wash. 2000) (enacted Mar. 24,2000); CAL. CODE 8 71,203, 
(effective Jan. 1,2000). California law requires all ships entering California ports from more than 200 
miles offshore to either empty ballast water in the deep sea (2,000 meters depth), retain ballast water 
on-board, or treat it, and to manage ballast sediments, unless operators can show that such measures 
would produce an unsafe condition for the ship. See id. $3 71,203-71,204(a). Operators must file re- 
ports regarding ballast management. See id. Q 71,204(b). The California Water Resources Control 
Board is required to evaluate alternative management measures and recommend best available tech- 
nologies that reflect the greatest economically feasible degree of reduction in the release of exotic spe- 
cies by 2002. See id. 3 71,210. 
308. See H.B. 2466 5 4(2). The treatment standard shall "ensure that the discharge of treated 
ballast water poses minimal risk of introducing nonindigenous species." Id. $ 5(5)(a). The department 
is directed to  consider technological and practical feasibility in developing the standard, and, "where 
practical and appropriate, the standards shall be compatible with standards set by the United States 
coast guard and shall be developed in consultation with federal and state agencies to ensure consis- 
tency with the federal clean water act, 33 U.S.C. $ 9  1251-1387." Id. 
309. See id. 5 5(5)(b). Washington law provides an exemption for safety, but it is narrower than 
that found in NISA. See id. 1 4(1) ("When weather or extraordinary circumstances make access to 
treatment unsafe to the vessel or crew, the master of a vessel may delay compliance with any treat- 
ment required under this subsection until it is safe to complete the treatment."). 
310. See S.B. 955,90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2000) (introduced Feb. 1,2000); Ron Brochu, Great 
Lakes Shipping Indurtry Protests Proposals to Sterilize Ballast Water, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. 
NEWS, May 4, 2000 (noting that sponsor Sen. Ken Sikkema has softened his stance to allow "best 
available technology" rather than mandating sterilization). 
311. See A.B. 11,369, 1999 Leg., 223d Sess. (N.Y. 2000) (introduced in Assembly and referred to 
Committee on Environmental Conservation June 9,2000). 
312. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1152 (2000) (holding 
"that Washington's tanker regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, En&h language 
skills, training, and casualty reporting [werej preempted [by federal law]"); Craig H. Allen, Federalism in 
the Era of International Standards: Federal and State Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in 
the United States (Part IV), 31 J .  MAR. L. & COM. 15 (2000) (proposing a new approach to maritime 
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be prohibited as interfering with international rights of passage.313 State 
laws that require changes in vessel design or construction are especially 
likely to be in~alidated.~'~ 
Even if lawful, disparate standards among states with stringent 
standards, like California, and more lenient states would result in a 
patchwork quilt of regulation. To ensure compliance, vessels could be 
required to meet the most stringent restrictions of all states they pass 
through. Ship owners and operators will resist individual state efforts as 
confusing and inefficient. Effective and even-handed implementation of 
the CWA's programs for NPDES permits and water-quality standards 
for the control of ballast discharges will depend on cooperative efforts 
between the EPA and the states and between the EPA and the Coast 
Guard. 
VI. INTERAGENCY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 
The CWA encourages and even requires coordination between the 
EPA and the states, and between the EPA and other federal entities, in- 
cluding the military and the Coast Guard, in the regulation of water pol- 
lution. As for other federal agencies, the EPA must, for example, in- 
clude a condition within permits issued to facilities that operate as 
transportation vessels specifying that their discharges comply with any 
applicable Coast Guard regulations for safe transportation, handling, and 
storage of pollutants.315 
More to the point, CWA section 312 specifies roles for both the 
EPA and the Coast Guard, and clarifies the role of the states, in regu- 
lating discharges of sewage through marine sanitation devices (MSDs) 
and incidental discharges from vessels of the armed forces through ma- 
rine pollution-control devices (MPCDS) .~~~  It requires the EPA to estab- 
lish general prohibitions and performance standards and provides the 
Coast Guard with enforcement authority, allowing it to board and in- 
spect vessels on U.S. waters and to execute warrants issued by officers or 
courts of competent j~risdiction.~~' Section 312 also allows a limited role 
for states to protect water quality, while minimizing the potential for 
preemption analysis, as a culmination of four articles on the regulation of vessel safety and pollution 
prevention). 
313. See Dubner, supra note 5, at 149-53 (discussing international conventions governing passage 
of foreign vessels). Coastal states may take steps to regulate pollution in temtorial seas, but such steps 
must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and may not interfere with rights of passage. See UN- 
CLOS, supra note 104, arts. 19,21, & 24. 
314. See Ray v.  Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163-68 (1978) (holding that Congress occu- 
pied the field and therefore preempted state laws on tanker design and construction); UNCLOS, supra 
note 104, art. 211 5 6(c) (state laws and regulations "may relate to discharges and navigational prac- 
tices but shall not require foreign vessels to observe design construction, manning or equipment stan- 
dards other than generally accepted international rules and standards."). 
315. See 40 C.F.R. 9 122.44(p) (1999). 
316. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 3 1322 (1994). 
317. See id. 9 1322(k)(l). CWA section 312 may also be enforced by a state. See id. 
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state requirements to conflict with federal objectives. As such, section 
312 could provide a cooperative model for the EPA to follow in regulat- 
ing ballast-water discharges. Because MSD and MPCD requirements are 
not implemented through the NPDES permit program, section 312 is not 
a complete analogy for regulating ballast-water discharges from cornrner- 
cia1 vessels. Instead, absent legislative amendment, this section should 
be considered merely as guidance for building working relationships 
among interested agencies and states. 
With respect to MSDs, the EPA, in consultation with the Coast 
Guard, must establish standards of performance to prevent the discharge 
of inadequately treated sewage from vessels,31s and must also establish a 
testing and certification regime to regulate the sale of MSDs3I9 The 
standards, which are phased in over time for existing vessels,320 must be 
consistent with maritime safety and other marine and navigation laws, 
and coordinated with Coast Guard standards.321 Commercial vessels op- 
erating in the Great Lakes must install MSDs that at least meet secon- 
dary treatment 
MPCD performance standards for military vessels are to be issued 
by the EPA and the Department of Defense, in consultation with the 
Coast Guard and the Secretaries of State and Commerce.323 The stan- 
dards should mitigate adverse impacts on the marine environment, con- 
sidering the nature and environmental effects of the discharge, the prac- 
ticability and costs of the installation and use of the MPCD, its effects on 
the vessel's operational capability, and applicable U.S. and international 
Standards may reflect distinctions between classes, types, and 
sizes of vessels, and may even be waived "as necessary or appropriate" 
for classes, types, or sizes of vessels, as well as for individual vessels.32s 
Currently, performance standards for military vessels are being is- 
sued pursuant to a joint effort by the EPA, Department of Defense 
(DOD), Department of State, Department of Commerce, and the Coast 
Guard.326 The EPA and DOD have determined that it is reasonable and 
318. See id. 9 1322(b). The EPA had previously been reluctant to regulate sewage discharges 
from vessels due to the lack of availability of pump-out facilities. See S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 66 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,4391. 
319. See 33 U.S.C. 9 1322(g)-(h). 
320. See id. Q 1322(c)(l)(A). 
321. See id. 9 1322(b)(l). 
322. See id. 0 1322(c)(l)(B). 
323. See 33 U.S.C. Q 1322(n)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1998); see also supra Part 1II.B. (discussing legisla- 
tive history of section 312(n)). 
324. 33 U.S.C. 8 1322(n)(2)-(3). CWA section 312(n) applies unless the Secretary of Defense 
finds that compliance "would not be in the national security interests of the United States." I d  9 
1322(n)(l). 
325. Id. 5 1322(c)(2). 
326. See Uniform National Discharge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 64 Fed. Reg. 
25,126, 25,130 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9 and 40 C.F.R. ch. VII); Uniform National Dis- 
charge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,298, 45,306 (1999) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1700 and ch. VII) (proposed Aug. 25,1998). 
No. 41 VIRTUES OF "COMMAND AND CONTROL" REGULATION 1281 
practicable to regulate discharges of ballast water through MPCDS,~" and 
that current management practices for open-ocean exchange, based on 
international guidelines, "demonstrate the availability of controls to 
mitigate the potential adverse environmental impacts from this dis- 
charge. "328 
Congress expressly preempted most state laws and regulations re- 
garding the design, manufacture, installation, or use of both MSDs and 
M P C D S . ~ ~ ~  Upon petition to the EPA, however, states may prohibit dis- 
charges in some or all of the waters within the state as required for the 
protection and enhancement of water quality, if the EPA determines, in- 
ter alia, that adequate facilities for the safe and sanitary removal and 
treatment of sewage or ballast water from vessels are reasonably avail- 
able.330 
Looking to section 312, the EPA, with Coast Guard cooperation 
and input, could issue national effluent limitations for ballast-water dis- 
charges from commercial vessels, reflecting BAT for MPCDs or alterna- 
tive treatment or exchange methods. The EPA, again with the Coast 
Guard as a consulting partner, could then issue general, regional, or indi- 
vidual permits incorporating the effluent limitations.331 With a unified 
body of standards in place, vessel owners and operators get the benefits 
of certainty, and ships could be modified or designed to meet the stan- 
dards, phased in to require state-of-the-art technologies within a reason- 
able period of 
327. See Uniform National Discharge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 63 Fed. Reg. at 
45,309 (defining MPCD, as used in the proposed rule, as "a control technology or a management prac- 
tice that can reasonably and practicably be installed or otherwise used on a vessel of the Armed Forces 
to receive, retain, treat, control or discharge a discharge incidental to the normal operation of the ves- 
sel"). 
328. Id. at 45,311. The Navy and the Coast Guard either currently implement or are in the proc- 
ess of approving a ballast-water management policy requiring an open-ocean, ballast-water exchange, 
based on the IMO Guidelines for Preventing the Introduction of Unwanted Aquatic Organisms and 
Pathogens from Ships' Ballast Water and Sediment Discharge. See id. at 45,306. In the final rule, the 
agencies noted that a more detailed assessment of the MPCD control options and performance stan- 
dards for each class of vessels would be performed in a subsequent phase of rulemaking. See Uniform 
National Discharge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 64 Fed. Reg. at 25,130. 
329. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1322(f)(l) (1994). States are allowed to impose more stringent requirements 
for MSDs on houseboats. Id. Q 1322(f)(l)(B). 
330. See id. Q 1322(f)(3)-(4), (n)(7)(B). 
331. See, e.g., Final General NPDES Permit for Seafood Processors in the State Waters of Alaska 
and in Receiving Waters Adjacent to Alaska and Extending Out 200 Nautical Miles from the Coast 
and Baseline of Alaska: Alaskan Seafood Processors General NPDES Permit (No. AKG-52-OOOO), 60 
Fed..Reg. 34,991 (1995) (notice of final general NPDES permit July 5, 1995) (authorizing certain dis- 
charges from offshore, nearshore and shore-based vessels and onshore facilities engaged in seafood 
processing; permitting discharges including processing wastes, process disinfectants, sanitary wastewa- 
ter, boiler water, gray water, water used to transfer seafood to a facility, and live tank water "to waters 
of the United States in and contiguous to the State of Alaska, except for receiving waters excluded 
from coverage as protected, special, at-risk, degraded or  adjacent to a designated 'seafood processing 
center"'; prohibiting discharges of petroleum hydrocarbons, toxic pollutants, or other pollutants not 
specified in the permit). 
332. See O'Toole, supra note 84, at 48. O'Toole concludes that "[tlhe best way to ensure Navy 
ship compliance is to develop a coherent body of effluent standards for application to all Navy ships in 
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Meanwhile, states would retain a role in enforcing the limitations 
contained within the permits.333 However, to avoid inconsistencies from 
port to port, the MSD and MPCD approach should be followed such that 
states could not impose more stringent requirements or establish "no dis- 
charge" zones absent appropriate determinations and approval by the 
EPA. Although states with delegated NPDES authority may be reluc- 
tant to relinquish some of that authority back to the federal agencies, in 
the context of ballast-water discharges, it would seem that states have 
more to gain than to lose under a program of uniform national effluent 
The EPA's ability to withdraw or otherwise limit only that part of a 
state NPDES program dealing with vessels may be inhibited by existing 
statutory provisions. The gist of section 402 is that states with "adequate 
authority" to carry out the permit program assume control over the en- 
tire program?35 To that end, state permit programs generally must be 
approved or disapproved in their entirety.336 The CWA does, however, 
allow for partial delegation, so long as the state's permit program covers 
major categories of point sources and is, in and of itself, a complete per- 
mit program covering a "significant and identifiable part of the State 
program. "337 
all waters of the U.S. and on the high seas." Id. at 46. Instead of EPA enforcement, however, he rec- 
ommends that the standards be implemented through the existing command and control structure of 
the Navy. See id. 
333. See 33 U.S.C. 3 1342(b). 
334. See O'Toole, supra note 84, at 48-49. 
335. 33 U.S.C. 3 1342(b)-(c). To  establish "adequate" permit authority, states must insure, 
among other things, that their permits will (1) comply with CWA provisions governing effluent Iimita- 
tions, new sources, toxic pollutants, MSDs, and ocean-discharge criteria; (2) be limited to fixed terms 
not exceeding five years; (3) be terminated or modified for cause; (4) require reporting and inspection; 
and (5) be enforceable through civil and criminal penalties. See id. 9 1342(b)(1)-(9). States must also 
insure that the EPA will receive notice of permit applications, see id. 5 1342(b)(4), and that no  permit 
will issue if the Army Corps of Engineers, gfter consulting with the Coast Guard, determines that "an- 
chorage and navigation" of navigable waters would be "substantially impaired." Id § 1342(b)(6). 
336. See id. 3 1342(c), (n); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 71 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 
3737; 2 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1489 (Comm. Print compiled for the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works 1973). 
Congress explained that "after a State submits a program which meets the criteria established by the 
Administrator pursuant to regulations, the Administrator shall suspend his activity in such State under 
the Federal permit program." Id. It went on to state that it was not, however, persuaded "that by lim- 
iting the EPA's authority to withdraw approval of a state program to withdrawing approval as to the 
entire program, Congress emphasized that only one government shall operate an NPDES permit pro- 
gram within a State. . . . Even in delegated states, EPA retains 'substantial review authority."' Id.; see 
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1976) (citing leg- 
islative history); Shell Oil v. Train, 585 F.2d 408,410 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the EPA has residual 
supervisory responsibility under section 402's veto and withdrawal provisibns, but stating that once a 
program is approved, the federal program is suspended, creating "a separate and independent State 
authority to administer the NPDES pollution controls") (citation omitted); see also Mianus River 
Preservation Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899,905 (2d Cir. 1976). 
337. 33 U.S.C. $ 1342(n)(3)-(4). These provisions were designed to aHow states to gradually as- 
sume a regulatory role, rather than taking authority for the entire program all at once. See Oliver A. 
Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of 
CWA 5 404 and Related Program to the States, 54 MD.  L. REV. 1242,1292-93 (1995). 
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Once a state program is approved, the EPA can withdraw its ap- 
proval if the state fails to administer it in accordance with federal re- 
quirement~.~~ '  Again, Congress intended that state programs not be 
p i e ~ e r n e a l e d . ~ ~ ~  In fact, Congress rejected an EPA proposal that section 
402 be revised to allow withdrawal for categories or classes of sources, 
reflecting its concern that states be given maximum responsibility for the 
NPDES program and that the EPA7s review authority be restricted as 
much as was consistent with its overall responsibility for assuring that the 
CWA7s national goals are met in a timely fashion.340 
In any event, EPA withdrawal is a drastic measure, and there are 
significant obstacles to taking back authority: "The procedures for with- 
drawal of state programs would be suitable for the Nuremburg trials, and 
will be invoked only upon epochal occasions.""' Because of its disrup- 
tive nature and the resulting ill-will, the EPA and state governments 
generally strive to avoid withdrawal.342 
Instead of withdrawing state NPDES programs that attempt to im- 
pose more stringent or contradictory requirements on ballast-water dis- 
charges, the EPA could take either of two less-drastic steps. Assuming 
that, once the EPA rescinds its exclusion for ballast-water discharges, 
states will have to seek approval of new provisions governing vessels, the 
EPA could simply refuse to approve that portion of the state program. 
Disapproval would be justified on the grounds that inconsistent state 
programs fail to comply with CWA provisions governing effluent limita- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Alternatively, if a state had an approved program, the EPA could 
veto individual ballast-water discharge permits issued by the state on the 
grounds that any nonuniform requirements are "outside the guidelines 
and requirements" of the CWA.344 In practice, the EPA's veto power is 
wielded with a light touch: "oversight is an essentially state-friendly pro- 
338. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3)-(4), (n). 
339. See id. 5 1342(c)(3), (d). These provisions have been described as giving "all-or-nothing 
authority to withdraw approval of a state NPDES program." EPA v. California ex rel. State Water 
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 226 11.39. 
340. See 1 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 814,854-55 (Comm. Print compiled for the Senate Comm. 
on Pub. Works 1973): H.R. REP. NO. 92-911 (1972). The first petition for the withdrawal of all dele- 
gated programs- air, water, and waste- was recently submitted by environmental groups in Ohio, in 
what the EPA calls an "unprecedented" move. See John C. Kuehner, U.S. EPA to Review Ohio 
EPA's Operations, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 2, 2000, at B1. The Ohio EPA is charged with mis- 
handling public complaints, making technical errors in issuing permits, and underenforcing permit 
violations. See id. Bertram Frey, Deputy Regional Counsel for Region 5, which includes Ohio, re- 
ported that withdrawal was unlikely; instead, "[ilf corrections are needed, and the Ohio EPA agrees to 
them, 'that's the end of it."' Id. 
341. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 367-68 (footnote omitted) (2d ed. 1994). 
342. See D. Brennen Keene, Comment, The Inconsistency of Virginia's Execution of the NPDES 
Permit Program: The Foreclos~cre of Citizen Attorneys General from State and Federal Courts, 29 U. 
RICH. L, REV. 715,748-49 (1995). 
343. See 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(b)(l) (1994). 
344. Id. § 1342(d)(2); see 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(c) (1999). 
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cess involving a great deal more jawboning and negotiation than ada- 
mant intrusion."345 However, individual permit supervision is far less of- 
fensive to state sovereignty than is withdrawal of the entire NPDES pro- 
gram, and the EPA should not be afraid to invoke its veto power in 
appropriate  circumstance^.^^^ Although Congress intended states to play 
a significant role in the NPDES program, Congress also wanted the EPA 
to assure uniformity and consistency by engaging in a vigorous review of 
state programs.347 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The CWA's NPDES program is clearly applicable to ballast-water 
discharges from vessels. Neither the difficulty of regulating mobile ves- 
sels, nor the possibility that costs may at times exceed economic benefits, 
justifies a refusal to regulate. The incorporation of technology-based 
controls through the NPDES permit system would result in rapid emis- 
sion reduction, and could ultimately eliminate contaminated ballast- 
water discharges altogether. 
Once the EPA rescinds its regulatory exclusion for ballast-water 
discharges, there are several approaches available to the EPA to mini- 
mize the administrative difficulties of regulating vessels and to ensure 
adequate control of their discharges through BAT and BADT. The 
regulatory outcome will be more readily acceptable to the shipping in- 
dustry and to other interested governmental players if the EPA issues 
new regulations and general or individual permits with the cooperation 
and input of the Coast Guard and affected coastal states. When the ap- 
propriate permits are in place, monitoring will be less costly and more 
consistent, and enforcement more easily accomplished. 
The imposition of BAT and BADT also could motivate vessel own- 
ers and operators to achieve a higher level of efficacy than under current 
requirements and guidelines. By imposing uniform national effluent 
limitations, the CWA levels the playing field and minimizes "forum 
shopping," and can even serve to stimulate innovation. Meanwhile, the 
states may still be able to play a meaningful role in controlling the dis- 
charge of ballast pollutants within their jurisdiction through delegated 
permit authority and water-quality standards. 
Economic approaches, on the other hand, whether in the form of 
taxes, subsidies, or effluent-trading programs, are not explicitly author- 
ized by the CWA. Even if implicitly allowed by law, none of these tools 
provides an adequate replacement for the uniform requirements man- 
345. Houck & Rolland, supra note 337, at 1293. 
346. See RODGERS, supra note 341, at 385 ("Individual permit supervision is a form of counsel 
quieter than a strident takeback of approved state authority (abhorrent for a variety of reasons) and 
should be invoked more often."). 
347. See S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 73 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4398; Houck & 
Rolland, supra note 337, at 1293. 
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dated by the CWA's NPDES program for point source discharges. 
Moreover, the multiple opportunities for public involvement and judicial 
review provided by the CWA, and the ease of enforcement of the 
NPDES program, weigh heavily in favor of the regulatory regime. 
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